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Abstract
This thesis studies how financial market outcomes are affected by the reputational
concerns of fund managers. The first chapter presents a model in which a fund
manager trades in an environment with uncertain market liquidity. The fund
manager trades off expected profits in the initial period and learning relating
to the investment strategy in the successive period. Surprisingly, the indirect
incentives do not cause the manager to focus on short-term returns to impress
investors but result in a behaviour that may be described as inefficient "long
termism". The model may help explain empirical puzzles such as the limits of
arbitrage, the convex flow-performance relationship and the excessive trading of
fund managers.
The second chapter focuses on the asset pricing implications of fund flows mo-
tivated by past performance. By investing in an out-performing asset, fund man-
agers can improve their reputations and therefore experience inflows of money
into their funds. In my model, the value of a fund manager’s reputation is state
dependent. In the case of an inefficient asset management market, I show that
asset prices are increasing in their beta. Furthermore, the asset price depends
on asset supply in my model.
The third chapter analyses the size of the active management sector in a
model where fund managers have reputational concerns. I show that the size
of the active management sector depends on the skill of the fund managers in
the sector in a non-monotone manner. The asset choices of fund managers are
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influenced by reputational concerns, and the information revelation of the skill of
the individual fund managers depends on market outcomes. The model predicts
that the amount of money invested in the active management sector may shrink
sharply following rare events.
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Chapter 1
Delegated Portfolio Management
and Uncertain Liquidity
1.1 Introduction
Hedge funds and mutual funds are an increasingly dominant force in today’s
financial markets. They spend vast resources finding and exploiting trading op-
portunities. However, their success in trading based on their information has
been questioned by an empirical literature pointing towards an inability to out-
perform various benchmarks. Since these institutions are typically large, the
price impact of their trades is often a major concern and a key determinant of
the scalability of their investments. The ability to manage trading costs is also
of great importance in the case of "smart-beta" strategies that follow mechan-
ical rules that have derived from asset market anomalies.1 For these types of
strategies, the core competencies that an investor should evaluate include not
only the stock-picking skill of a fund, but also its ability to implement the strat-
1For example, money management companies such as AQR and Dimensional Fund Advisors offer
funds that invest based on momentum, value, size and quality factors. Ratcliffe, Miranda and Ang
(2016) discuss the capacity of various smart beta strategies.
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egy with low trading costs. In this paper, I study the interplay between a fund
manager’s incentives that stem from investor flows and the need to manage price
impact efficiently. My model indicates that these incentives can cause inefficient
management of the price impact of trades. Surprisingly, the short-term flow-
performance relationship caused by return-chasing investors, induces inefficient
"long-termism" on the part of the fund manager. The fund is incentivised to
give up too much of its profits early on in order to learn how to implement the
investment strategy in the future.
The main reason an investment strategy has limited capacity, is that typically the
more you trade on an idea, the more you move prices, decreasing the strategy’s
profitability. For many strategies, there is a significant amount of uncertainty
regarding their scalability. Uncertainty about scalability is closely related to un-
certainty about the price impact costs of the trades.2 Given this uncertainty,
large financial institutions spend a considerable amount of resources trying to
estimate price impact costs. They purchase information technology systems and
hire consulting firms in order to overcome this problem.3 Uncertainty about scal-
ability is an important issue even for well-known market anomalies, as confirmed
by a current debate among practitioners and academics on the scalability of such
strategies. A recent paper by Frazzini, Israel and Moskowitz (2012) received
great attention among practitioners as it hints at the much greater scalability
of some well-known anomalies (e.g. momentum) than estimated by previous
academic research, but it found that others are limited in their scalability (e.g.
2 In general, other explicit trading costs such as commissions and bid-ask spreads are small and
easy to measure for large institutions. For example, Stoll and Whaley (1983) examine the effects of
commissions and spreads on size portfolios.
3There is a firm called "Investment technology group" which provides these services. One of their
core services is trading analytics. Their consultants are experts in market microstructure and finan-
cial engineering and they help to forecast price impact costs. (http://www.itg.com/product/trading-
analytics/)
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short-term reversal).4 Since the most reliable way to learn about price impact
costs is to actually trade in the market, realised returns of funds may help in
learning about the scalability of a strategy. For example, when asked whether
investors can profit from momentum, Fama and French state, "Many academics
claim that trading costs will wipe out any benefits of trying to trade actively on
momentum. This will now be tested by live funds. The results will be interest-
ing."(Fama and French Forum 2010). Fama and French suggest that they will
update their opinion about momentum after seeing the first returns of money
management companies trading on the anomaly.
Motivated by these stylised facts, I consider a model of strategic trading where
an insider trades in the presence of uncertain liquidity. The investment strategy
of the insider is based on perfect information about the asset payoff. In a model
inspired by Kyle (85), uncertain liquidity means that the price response to large
market orders is uncertain. This is equivalent to uncertainty with regards to
scalability of the investment strategy. I compare the behaviour of two types
of insiders: a fund manager and a profit-maximising trader, who implements
the first best trading strategy. The goal is to investigate how indirect incentives
influence the fund manager’s behaviour. The fund manager is compensated based
on the amount of money he manages and the returns he is expected to generate.
Competitive outside investors supply funds to the manager until they earn a zero
net (after fees) expected return (similar to Berk and Green (2004)). In this way,
the fund manager extracts the entire surplus he generates in any given period.
The size of this surplus and consequently, the size of the fund depends on two
factors. The first is the expected level of liquidity, a higher liquidity means less
price impact and more scalability. The second is the level of information about
liquidity. Better information results in better management of the price impact.
4For example, in a blog article by alpha architect the issue is discussed
http://blog.alphaarchitect.com/2016/08/17/surprise-the-size-value-and-momentum-anomalies-
survive-after-trading-costs
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In a two-period model, the realised price impact in the first period is a noisy
signal of liquidity and, thus, of the scalability of the strategy. A price that is not
affected by the trade of the fund signals a liquid market. The informativeness of
the signal that the price sends, is influenced by the aggressiveness of the trade in
the first period. Both the fund manager and the trader face a trade off between
an optimal execution, which maximises profits in the initial period, and the
optimal level of learning about the trading environment for the next period. A
higher trade risks price impact today, but also provides more informative signals.
The trader optimally trades off these two effects. The fund manager shares the
costs of the excessive trading with current investors. In the following period the
fund manager can capture the full benefit of learning through investor inflows.
Thus, I find that the fund manager overweighs learning for the long run and, in
turn, gives up too much of its expected profits today. This happens despite the
fact that investors react positively to higher returns with inflows. The outside
investors always break even, so the cost of inefficient learning is borne by the fund
manager. The initial inflows reflect the surplus the fund manager is expected to
create in the present period only. The initial investors do not benefit from the
learning of the fund manager, since the fund will open up again in the interim
period and new inflows result in zero after-fee returns going forward. The fund
manager is unable to commit to not trading excessively, so the initial size of the
fund will be small, resulting in a low fee income for the fund.
This paper sheds light on the existing debate on the scalability of investment
strategies among academics and practitioners. Based on my model, a strategy
could well be scalable, but the fund manager has incentives to implement the
strategy with excessively aggressive trades. Then outside observers, such as Fama
and French, rationally conclude that there is a high probability that the strategy
is not scalable. Thus, trading strategies that would appear to be implementable
in studies with estimated price impact, may often deliver disappointing returns
when implemented by fund managers. The problem of inefficient management
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of price impact identified in my model, can also help explain why some scalable
investment strategies are not implemented by funds to such a scale so that the
trading opportunities disappear.
My model is also related to a number of other stylised empirical facts. It points
toward a new explanation of the asymmetric and convex flow-performance of mu-
tual funds and hedge funds as documented in empirical papers (e.g. Chevalier
and Ellison (1997)). The flow-performance relationship is positive since higher
performance increases the estimate of the scalability of the fund’s strategy. Ad-
ditionally, a very high performance allows the fund manager to be fairly certain
about the state of liquidity. This certainty increases his expected profits. The
two effects together yield convexity. Furthermore, the model may help explain
excessive trading by fund managers as documented in empirical studies such as
Edelen, Evans and Kadlec (2007).5 I find that in the initial period the fund man-
ager trades excessively as he tries to learn more about market liquidity. In my
model, the fund manager would like to commit to closing in the interim period.
If I allow for this possibility, my model generates return persistence. A high re-
turn is more likely to come from a scalable strategy, resulting in higher expected
returns going forward. This implication of my model may help us understand the
empirical evidence of hedge fund returns persistence (see Jagannatha, Malakhov
and Novikov (2010); Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai (2008)). In particular,
Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) document that return persistence is stronger for
younger funds. For younger funds the problem of uncertain scalability may be
more relevant.
This paper is broadly related to a stream of research that studies how reputational
concerns influence the trading decisions of fund managers and the functioning of
financial markets (e.g. Dow and Gorton (1997), Dasgupta and Prat (2006,2008),
Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo (2011), Cuoco and Kaniel (2011), Guerrieri and
5Other explanations based on reputational concerns of the same phenomena are given in Dow and
Gorton (1997) and Dasgupta and Prat (2006)
17
Kondor (2012)). There is also a connection to Makarov and Plantin (2015),
who study risk shifting of fund managers. Furthermore, my model is related
to papers that study how investor flows may affect limits of arbitrage (Shleifer
and Vishny (1997)). The main difference from previous papers on the agency
problems of fund managers is that the mechanism in my model is based on
excessive learning by the fund manager and not learning about the fund’s type
by investors. In these papers, the distortion comes from the fund’s attempts to
impress investors; e.g. in Dasgupta and Prat (2006), the fund manager trades
without information for a chance to appear informed. In my model the fund
manager also trades excessively, but here, the fund manager does so in order to
enable more learning about the strategies’ scalability. The model also contributes
to a vast literature on strategic trading and price impact (Kyle (85), Easley
and O’Hara (1987), Glosten and Harris (1988), Huberman and Stanzl (2000)).
Hong and Rady (2002) present a model with uncertain liquidity in which each
trader only trades once. Thus, they cannot analyse how optimal learning distorts
trading decisions. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper in which
trades are partly "experiments" to learn about liquidity. Furthermore, papers
that study the aggressiveness of trading based on private information do not
take into account agency problems that these large traders might face. My
paper fills this gap, since this is particularly relevant for firms such as hedge
funds and mutual funds, for which indirect incentives are a large part of the
total compensation of the decision maker. Finally, this paper is also related
to a vast theoretical literature on bandit problems and experimentation dating
to Robbins (1952). Strategic experimentation is also analysed in theoretical
economics (e.g. Aghion, Bolton, Harris and Jullien (1991), Bolton and Harris
(1999), Manso (2011)). Recent applications of the paradigm in corporate finance
include Bergemann and Hege (1998,2005). The paper is also related to papers
that study managerial "short-termism". A bias for short-term projects may be
due to career concerns (Narayanan (1985)), concerns about stock prices (Stein
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(1989)) or herding behaviour (Zwiebel (1995)). In contrast to this literature, in
my model there is inefficient "long-termism".
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, I illustrate
the main mechanism of the paper using an example model in the spirit of Berk
and Green (2004). In Section 3, I present the main model and solve for the
equilibrium. Then, in section 4, I relate my model and its results to the empirical
evidence and conclude. All proofs are included in the Appendix.
1.2 Long Termism of Fund Managers
1.2.1 An Example
I introduce a very stylised model in the spirit of Berk and Green (2004) in order
to illustrate the main mechanism of my paper. There are two time periods
t ∈ {1, 2}. For the rest of the paper, everyone is risk neutral, and there is no
discounting between the two time periods. There is a fund manager with access
to a technology that produces excess returns. If the fund manager6 puts x > 0
dollars into the technology, then the x dollars become
xR− Ct(x) (1.1)
where R > 1, and Ct denotes the trading costs. For simplicity, I assume that R is
non-stochastic. I assume, as in Berk and Green (2004), that Ct has the properties
Ct(x) > 0, C
′
t(x) ≥ 0 and C ′′t (x) > 0, with Ct(0) = 0 and limx→∞C ′t(x) = ∞.
In addition to this investment technology, the fund manager can invest in a
benchmark technology with a risk free return RBM = 1. There are outside
investors who can flow into the fund or into the benchmark technology. In each
period, there is a morning and an afternoon. The inflows happen in the morning
and the investment decision x happens in the afternoon. The total investment
6Sometimes simply referred to as "fund".
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in the fund is given by f˜t. The fund is compensated by the following exogenous
contract at the end of a time period t ∈ {1, 2}
γM f˜t + γP f˜t(R˜− 1) (1.2)
where R˜ is the realised gross return of the fund. I assume that γM ∈ (0, 1) and
γP ∈ [0, 1).7
This contract includes a few special cases, such as γP = 0, the contract that
Berk and Green (2004) focuses on. This case is mainly observed in the mutual
fund space.8 Hedge funds, however, typically charge a substantial incentive fee.9
I summarises the outcome in the Berk and Green (2004) model when C1(x) =
C2(x) = C(x). The fund’s returns is
R˜ =
xR− C(x) + f˜ − x
f˜
. (1.3)
Once the fund manager received the inflows f˜ , he invests xˆ to maximise his
compensation
max
x∈[0,∞]
γM f˜ + γP (xR− C(x) + (f˜ − x)− f˜). (1.4)
Let me write xˆ as the solution to this problem. The inflow f˜ in each period will
be such that outside investors are indifferent between investing with the fund or
on their own. Thus, the after fee excess return of the fund needs to be equal to
the excess return of the benchmark technology, i.e.
(1− γP )(R˜− 1)− γM = 0. (1.5)
7Since this is a deterministic framework, where the fund does not produce any losses, I can write
the contract in this simple way. Everything would be exactly the same if I would write the incentive
fee part as γP max(f˜t(R˜− 1), 0)
8ICA of 1940 prohibits mutual funds from charging asymmetric incentive fees
9For hedge funds the typical contract we see in the real world is "a 2-20" contract. This would
correspond to γM = 0.02 and γP = 0.2.
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From xˆ, (1.3) and (1.5) the inflow f˜ can be found. This also yields the compen-
sation of the fund.
Lemma 1. [Berk and Green (2004)] For t ∈ {1, 2}, the amount of investment
in each period is
xˆ := C ′−1(R− 1). (1.6)
The fund manager is paid the full expected profits (NPV) that he makes in any
given period. These profits are given by
Π = (R− 1)xˆ− C(xˆ). (1.7)
The amount invested with the fund each period is given by
f˜ = Π
1− γP
γM
. (1.8)
Any contract of the form γM , γP ∈ (0, 1) such that f˜ > xˆ achieves the efficient
outcome.
An important implication of this model is that the need for outside investors
to break even results in a fund manager who always collects the full profits he
makes in any given period. These are given by Π in both periods in the lemma.
Thus, in total, the fund makes 2 Π.
I introduce one new assumption to this framework. There is the possibility of
learning by trading. Specifically, I assume that when the fund manager operates
the strategy at a sufficiently large scale, he is able to learn from the experience.
I assume
C2(x) =
δC(x) ⇐⇒ x1 ≥ x¯C(x) ⇐⇒ x1 < x¯ (1.9)
where 0 < δ < 1. This means that if the strategy was implemented with more
than x¯ dollars invested, the fund can operate more efficiently in the next period.
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This assumption seems natural, as a larger investment today lets the fund learn
more and reduces the cost of the same strategy tomorrow. I will provide a micro-
foundation for this assumption in the main model in the next section based on
an uncertain price impact. I assume that xˆ < x¯, so there is a trade-off in the
first period. A key friction in my model is that the fund manager cannot commit
to a certain size of investment ex-ante.
At time t = 2, the total compensation of the fund will be the expected profits
in that period. In the case of learning, the profit in the second period is ΠH :=
(R − 1)xˆH − δC(xˆH) where xˆH := C ′−1(R−1δ ). It is obvious that ΠH > Π. The
expected compensation of the fund at t = 2 will thus be either ΠH or Π depending
on the choice of x in the first period.
In the initial period, the fund essentially chooses between two investment levels
x. One possibility would be to invest xˆ, which delivers profits Π. Since xˆ < x¯,
this is not enough to reduce costs in the next period. Another possibility would
be to select an investment of x¯. This investment is inefficiently high today, but
is the best way to capture increased efficiency in the next period. Let ΠL :=
(R− 1)x¯− C(x¯), we clearly have ΠL < Π, since xˆ < x¯.
In order to obtain the best overall profits (to implement the first best strategy),
it would be optimal to invest xˆ in the case
ΠL + ΠH < 2Π ⇐⇒ ΠH − Π < Π− ΠL (1.10)
and x¯ otherwise. When the loss in the first period Π − ΠL is higher than the
gain from the increased efficiency in the second period ΠH − Π, then it is not
worthwhile to pick x¯ in order to learn. Suppose that δ is large enough that (1.10)
is satisfied. What will the fund do?10
Proposition 2. The fund manager invests excessively relative to the first best
strategy.
10I assume here that γM , γP are small enough so that 1−γPγM ΠL > x¯. Alternatively, I could allow
borrowing at the risk-free benchmark rate.
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Suppose that the fund receives an initial inflow f˜1. In the initial period, the fund
maximises
max
x∈[0,∞]
γM f˜1 + γP (xR− C(x) + (f˜1 − x)− f˜1) + Π + 1x≥x¯(ΠH − Π). (1.11)
Once the fund has collected f˜1, he takes this inflow as given, and the optimal
x ∈ [0,∞] could be either xˆ or x¯. The last two terms represent the compensation
of next period. It is clear that no x ∈ [0, x¯) can be a better choice than xˆ.
Similarly, a x > x¯ is always worse than x = x¯, by the convexity assumption on
C(x). The fund will choose x = x¯ if and only if
γPΠL + ΠH > γPΠ + Π ⇐⇒ ΠH − Π > γP (Π− ΠL). (1.12)
Comparing (1.10) and (1.12) makes the "long-termism" problem clear. The
benefit of learning in the long run ΠH −Π is overweighted relative to the short-
term cost of learning Π− ΠL.
Since γP ∈ [0, 1), we might well have that both (1.10) and (1.12) are satisfied.
The fund puts full weight on the benefit of learning, but only γP weight on
the cost of learning. This results in an inefficiently large amount of investment.
In particular, when there is no incentive fee, the fund always chooses to invest
heavily in order to learn, even if this is potentially very inefficient. The investors
of the morning of the initial period anticipate the excessive investment. Since
investors need to break even in the first period, the compensation of the fund in
that period totals ΠL. The fund manager’s total compensation then is
ΠL + ΠH < 2 Π. (1.13)
Therefore, the fund manager suffers from the excessive investment through his
first period inflows. He is unable to commit to a level of investment and once the
investment is determined he has incentive to over-invest as he takes the current
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assets under management as given. Thus, in the end, the fund manager is worse
off when he has the opportunity to learn than when there is no learning potential,
as in lemma 1.
Discussion. The short-term inflows, which the fund collects at the interim
date, lead the fund to care more about the long run and so he over-invests in
the strategy to improve for the next period. The first important assumption is
that the fund manager can open the fund to new investors after the first period
and thus capture the full benefits of learning in the first period. The second
important assumption is that the fund manager cannot commit to not engage
in excessive investment. In this framework, where there is no uncertainty, the
after-fee returns of the funds are always equal to outside option 1; the fund grows
over time in this example: f˜2
f˜1
= ΠH
ΠL
. Growth happens even though the returns
of the fund are constant and the inflow in the fund is not related to investors
updating their opinions about the fund (as in Berk and Green (2004)). Here,
inflows are due to learning by the fund about the investment strategy and not
by investors learning about the fund. In the full model that I develop in the rest
of the paper, there is a positive flow-performance relationship. I will consider
an environment where there is uncertainty about the price impact of trades and,
thus, room for learning. In my model, more aggressive trades result in better
learning and higher average profits in the next period, which is consistent with
(1.9). Furthermore, in this model, high returns signal a scalable strategy and,
therefore, results in high inflows. One might expect that in light of this flow-
performance relationship, the fund increasingly cares about the short term and
would try to impress investors. However, I find that the fund chooses to trade
too aggressively and that the "long termism" problem remains.
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1.3 The Model
1.3.1 Setup
In this paper, I contrast the behaviour of two types of insiders I11. Our insider I
could be a profit-maximising trader or a fund manager, i.e., I ∈ {trader, fund}.
I use the trader as the agent that implements the first best and compare her
outcome to that of the fund manager who invests on behalf of investors. The
insider I has private information about the dividends of a traded asset. The
insider then seeks to optimally take advantage of this information. There is a
risky asset that pays a dividend v, where v ∈ {0, 1}, at the end of the period. I
assume that
P(v = 1) = 1/2. (1.14)
The insider has perfect information about v and can submit a market order of x˜
shares of the asset. I will first consider a one-period model and then a two-period
model. I assume the following for the price of the risky asset
P ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}. (1.15)
The insider does not know how deep the market in which she trades is. A
deep market means a substantial amount of trading is possible with little price
impact.12 Market depth L has the property L ∈ {∆L,∆H}. A high value L =
∆H > ∆L > 0 means that the market is deep. I assume that
∆H
∆L
< 2. (1.16)
11I use the term "insider" as in Kyle (85), but the situation I have in mind is not necessarily insider
trading. It simple means that this market trading participant has an informational advantage.
12In my paper, "high liquidity" and "deep market" are different terms for the same concept and are
used interchangeably. A deep market also means that the fund strategy is more scalable.
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The insider I only knows that
P(L = ∆H) = q. (1.17)
The realised price then has the following property
P(P = 1/2) =
1−
x˜
L
∀x˜ ∈ [0, L]
1 + x˜
L
∀x˜ ∈ [−L, 0).
(1.18)
P(P = 1) =
x˜
L
∀x˜ ∈ [0, L] P(P = 0) = −x˜
L
∀x˜ ∈ [−L, 0). (1.19)
For general x˜ we have
P(P = 1/2) = max
(
1− |x˜|
L
, 0
)
P(P = 1) = min
(
max(
x˜
L
, 0), 1
)
P(P = 0) = min
(
max(
−x˜
L
, 0), 1
)
.
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Figure 1.1: The expected price as a function of the market order x˜
Microfoundation. In the Appendix, I provide a simple micro-foundation for
this type of price function. The main idea behind the price function is as follows:
the uncertain liquidity corresponds to an uncertain variance of noise trading.
Noise traders submit market orders that are uniform on an interval of length
L. A market maker knows L, but assumes the probability of the presence of
an insider to be negligible. The market maker observes the sum of the market
orders of noise traders and the insider. Whenever the total amount of trade is
in the interval, the price is the expectation. A price outside the interval reveals
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the presence and the direction of the informed trade. In this case, the price is
v. The probability of the total market orders slipping out of the interval and
information being revealed is then given as in the assumption above.
Comments on the model. The model is motivated by the model of strate-
gic trading in Kyle (85). The more shares the insider buys, the more likely it
becomes that P = 1 is realised. Similarly, large sales mean that a low price
becomes more likely, i.e., that P = 0. The prices in this model switch between
different extremes for tractability. This model could represent a variety of real
world situations. It is quite easy to backtest an investment strategy and find
out if the strategy would have delivered high abnormal return "on paper", i.e.,
returns without incorporating trading costs. However, it is often unclear to the
investment manager to what extent the strategy survives trading costs. The
importance of uncertainty in scalability and price impact is also confirmed by
a current debate among practitioners and academics about the scale at which
some investment strategies could be deployed. A recent paper by Frazzini, Israel
and Moskowitz (2012) hints at the much higher scalability of some well-known
anomalies than had been estimated by previous academic research. This is also
in contrast with previous studies that have found the opposite results. Chen,
Stanzl, and Watanabe (2002) conclude that only small fund sizes are possible
before costs eliminate any profits on value, momentum and size portfolios. Fur-
thermore, Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2003) find that trading costs make the prof-
its from momentum strategies vanish. However, Asness, Frazzini and Moskowitz
(2014) argue that one of the great myths of momentum is that it does not survive
trading costs. My model aims to capture a situation where the insider has found
a way to predict v (for simplicity, she always perfectly predicts v) and starts trad-
ing in the presence of uncertain liquidity. The insider does not know the effect
of trades on the asset price. In order to mitigate the problems associated with
uncertain price impact, large financial institutions rely on information technol-
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ogy to estimate price impact. Furthermore, some consulting firms help traders
estimate price impact. Some fund management companies spend significant re-
sources developing proprietary price-impact estimation techniques. The problem
of uncertain price impact should be even more relevant for investment strategies
where the trader obtains private information that is related to a specific time
window around an event or that is short lived. Furthermore, trading could be
required in situations where the price impact is different from the usual, such
as shortly before corporate events. For example, there is evidence that there is
a greater price impact prior to earnings announcements as shown in, e.g., Kim
and Verrecchia (1994). In this case, price-impact costs may be even harder to
estimate and predict.
The price impact in this model is linear, the expected price is given by
E[P |x˜, L] = 1/2 + 1/2 x˜
L
(1.20)
for some x˜ such that |x˜| < L.
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Figure 1.2: Illustration of the model structure
Trader. An insider of type trader chooses a market order x˜ in each period to
maximise her expected profits. Thus, the trader will serve as the frictionless
benchmark. The profit maximisation for the trader means that she will chooses
a market orders x˜ in order to maximise her expected profits over the whole game.
Each period the profits are given by
E[x˜(v − P )|v]. (1.21)
Fund manager. The fund manager invests on behalf of outside investors that
put their money into his fund. To model the behaviour of the investors in our fund
manager, I utilise the approach of Berk and Green (2004) as in section 2. Our
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period has a morning and an afternoon. There is a large mass of outside investors
endowed with one dollar each in the morning of the period. They are risk neutral
and want to maximise consumption in the afternoon. Their outside option is to
invest in a vehicle with a normalised expected return E[RBM ] = 1. I fix a "2-
20" contract between the fund manager and his investors. As in section 2, the
fund manager cannot commit to a trading strategy ex-ante. The compensation
contract is as in Section 2. Given some inflows f˜ and some realised return R˜,
the fund manager obtains a share γM ∈ (0, 1) of the inflow as a management fee
and a share γP ∈ [0, 1) as a incentive fee. This means that the compensation of
the fund received in the afternoon of each period is given by
γM f˜ + γP f˜(R˜− 1) (1.22)
where R˜ is the realised return of the fund in that period. The fund manager
chooses trades in order to maximise his fee income over the whole game.
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Figure 1.3: The structure of the model
1.3.2 One-period model
For simplification and clarification, I first solve a one-period model in which the
insider only faces the opportunity one time. Π(q, θ) := E[x˜(v−P )|v, x˜ = −1v+1θ]
is the expected profit of the informed trader as a function of the probability of a
deep market when submitting a symmetric market order x˜ = θ when v = 1 and
x˜ = −θ when v = 0. It is clear by the symmetry of the model that the insider
always buys/sells the same amount of shares given some private information.
The parameter θI can be interpreted as the aggressivness of the insider of type
I. This aggressiveness is one of the main objects in which I am interested.
The following lemma summarises the equilibrium of the one-period model.
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Lemma 3. Insiders of both types will trade the same way. Insiders of both types
I submit a market order x˜I = (−1)v+1θBM where
θBM = 1/2
∆H ∆L
∆Lq + (1− q)∆H . (1.23)
The expected profits of the trader and the expected compensation of the fund
manager is given by
Π(q) := Π(q, θBM) = 1/8
∆H ∆L
∆Lq + (1− q)∆H . (1.24)
The probability that the information will be revealed is given by
P(P ∈ {1, 0}) = 1/2 = P(P = 1/2). (1.25)
The inflows in the fund are
f˜(q) =
1− γP
γM
Π(q). (1.26)
The fund is indifferent between any contract γM , γP .
Proof. See the Appendix.
1.3.3 Discussion
I find that some implications of the Kyle (85) model survive in this framework.
One-half of the time, the private information of the insider is fully revealed in the
price. This is similar to Kyle (85), where 1/2 of the insiders’ private information
is incorporated into prices. The amount of information conveyed through prices
is not dependent on the variance of noise trading in Kyle (85) and it does not
depend on the expected market depth in my model.
Suppose that q ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the insiders profits are simply 1/8L and, thus,
linear in L. This is similar to Kyle (85), where the profits of the insider are
linearly increasing in the volatility of noise trading. The assumption that prices
switch between different extremes makes the analysis more tractable compared
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to what I would find with a classical Kyle (85) model when I consider the main
results of this paper. In terms of the inflows, the mechanism here is as in the Berk
and Green (2004) model. The funds flow in until they obtain the same return as
their outside option. The fund manager collects all the rents and trades in the
same way and obtains the same expected profit as the trader in the one-period
case. Since in the one-period case the two types of insiders behave in the same
way, there is no need to distinguish between the two for the remainder of this
section.
Corollary 4. Holding expected liquidity constant, the expected profits of an in-
sider I are lower when there is uncertainty about L compared to when there is
not.
Holding expected liquidity constant, the insider trades less aggressively when there
is uncertainty about L compared to when there is not.
Proof. See the Appendix.
It makes sense that the profits are lower with uncertainty, since uncertainty
affects the choice of θ. With uncertainty, the market order is not ideal in both
cases, that is, when L = ∆H or when L = ∆L.13
The following lemma will be important for the rest of our analysis.
Lemma 5. The expected profits of an insider given by Π(q) are convex in the
probability of high liquidity q.
Proof. See the Appendix.
13The results are similar in Hong and Rady (2002), suggesting that the main mechanism in this
paper is similar to what we would find had we assumed a standard Kyle (85) model.
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What is the intuition behind that result? A higher probability of the high-
liquidity state clearly increases the profits of the insider, since she can trade
more without revealing information. However, starting from a situation where
q = 0, an increase in q also makes the trader more uncertain. This increase in
uncertainty causes a small increase in expected utility. As the initial q becomes
larger, the situation involves greater uncertainty, so the effect is weaker and the
increase is larger. At some point, an increase in q not only increases expected
liquidity but also makes the insider more certain of the true state of high liquidity.
Thus, the increase in expected utility is large.
1.3.4 Two-period model
In this section, I assume that the insider obtains perfect information about v for
two periods in a row. The insider can trade based on her information two times,
but L stays the same over the two periods. I still assume that in the beginning
of the model everyone knows that P(L = ∆H) = q.
In this two-period model, the insider gains experience from trading based on
the information in the first period. Her price impact tells her about the depth
of the market. In the following, we will see that a price that does not reveal
information, i.e., P = 1/2 in the first period increases the insider’s confidence in
high liquidity. A large price impact, i.e., P ∈ {0, 1} will signal low liquidity.
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Figure 1.4: Signal structure
The market order θ influences the precision of the signal about L provided by the
realised price at time t = 1. The price is an asymmetric binary signal. Suppose
that θ < ∆L. Then, the likelihood ratio is strictly increasing in θ for P = 1/2
P(L = ∆H |P = 1/2)
P(L = ∆L|P = 1/2) =
1− θ/∆H
1− θ/∆L
q
1− q (1.27)
but stays constant for P ∈ {0, 1}
P(L = ∆H |P ∈ {0, 1})
P(L = ∆L|P ∈ {0, 1}) =
∆L
∆H
q
1− q . (1.28)
Thus, it is clear that the expected informativeness of the price signal is increasing
in θ for θ < ∆L. Similarly, I can show that expected informativeness is decreasing
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in θ for θ > ∆L. Let me denote the posterior probabilities q2 = P(L = ∆H |P, θ).
This is the probability of high liquidity given the first period’s realised price P
and aggressiveness θ. Updating with Bayes’ rule results in
P(L = ∆H |P1 = 1/2, θ) > q and P(L = ∆H |P1 ∈ {0, 1}, θ) < q. On the other
hand, if θ > ∆L we obtain P(L = ∆H |P1 = 1/2, θ) = 1 and P(L = ∆H |P1 ∈
{0, 1}, θ) < q.
This shows that a high price impact is a sign of low liquidity.
Lemma 6. (Learning by trading) The expected next-period profits E1[Π(q2)|θ]
are increasing in aggressiveness θ at t = 1 for θ < ∆L. The expected profits are
maximised with aggressiveness θ = ∆L.
The expected profits at t = 2 are increasing in the informativeness of the price
signal the insider receives about the state of liquidity L, and this signal depends
on aggressiveness θ. A more aggressive trade up to ∆L increases the informa-
tiveness of the price, which can be seen from figure 1.3.1. The difference between
the expected prices in the two states of liquidity is highest for θ = ∆L. A more
precise signal then allows the trader to submit a market order that is more ap-
propriate given the perceived liquidity of the market. This lemma can be seen
as a micro-foundation of assumption (1.9) from section 2.
The trader. The trader’s trade-off involves managing the price impact today
and adjusting her trades in order to learn optimally for tomorrow. She chooses
her aggressiveness
θtrader = argmax
θ
Π(q, θ) + E1[Π(q2)|θ]. (1.29)
In the following, I consider θBM , the optimal aggressiveness we would have
in the one-period model according to lemma 3 for both types of insiders I ∈
{trader, fund}. If an insider would only care about this periods’ profits, the
optimal order would be (−1)v+1θBM , so the difference between the optimal trade
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in the first period of the two-period model and θBM is how learning influences
the trade decision.
Proposition 7 (Learning trader). The optimal demand of the trader in the first
period is given by
θtrader =
(
3∆H(1−q)+3 q∆L−
√
5 (∆H−∆L)2q2−6 (∆H−2/3 ∆L)(∆H−∆L)q+∆H2
)
∆L ∆H
4∆H
2(1−q)+4∆L2q .
The learning trader trades more aggressive at t = 1 compared to the one-period
benchmark with
θtrader > θBM . (1.30)
Proof. See the Appendix.
I show that the incentive to learn about liquidity leads the trader to "experiment"
in the first period. Starting from the optimal trade θBM that maximises the
profits in this period, the trader can perform better by slightly increasing the
size of the order in this period. By doing so, she does not hurt this periods’ profits
much, but she is able to increase the precision of the signal she receives from the
price. An unrevealing price then provides a stronger signal of a deep market.
This confidence allows her to expect to better exploit the trading opportunity in
next period.
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Figure 1.5: Timeline of the model
The fund manager. The fund manager would like to trade in order for him
to maximise his overall compensation. At time t = 1, he has both direct and
indirect incentives. His direct incentives stem from the share γP that he obtains
of the fund profits at the end of the period, so he would like to produce high
returns that result in a high payment. He also has to consider the indirect incen-
tives of future inflows. In the morning of the second period, the forward-looking
investors rationally flow in (out) after good (bad) performance, depending on the
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outcome of the previous period. The flows are not related to skill of the manager
in terms of his knowledge of the payoff v. Everyone knows that the manager
has perfect information about v. Furthermore, there is also no asymmetric in-
formation between the fund manager and the investors. The investors observe
the return that the fund realises R˜1 and can thus deduce the price impact and
market order x˜. Then, the inflows at time t = 2 given by f˜2(q2) will depend on
the signal that the returns send about liquidity. By the results of the previous
section, q2 is increasing in R˜1; thus, higher returns result in higher inflows. This
is consistent with a large empirical literature documenting a positive short-term
flow-performance relationship. In my model, high returns signal the scalability
of the investment strategy at hand. The next proposition indicates how the fund
manager behaves.
Proposition 8 (Learning fund manager). The fund manager is excessively con-
cerned with the long run. The fund is more aggressive than the trader is in the
first period
θfund > θtrader. (1.31)
The total expected compensation of the fund manager is less than the expected
profits of the trader.
In case γP = 0, we get θfund = ∆L.
Proof. See Appendix.
1.3.5 Discussion
This result shows that in the presence of an uncertain price impact, the fund
manager is not able to optimally take advantage of the investment opportunity
at hand. This may shed light on why practitioners are worried about price
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impact and sometimes fail to implement investment strategies optimally. In my
model, it could very well be that a strategy is very scalable (L = ∆H) but would
appear not to be most of the time because funds trade too aggressively. For
example, despite evidence that momentum is very scalable from Frazzini, Israel
and Moskowitz (2012), Carhart (1997) concludes that transactions costs consume
the gains from a momentum strategy implemented by mutual funds. My model
suggests that these mutual funds were trading too aggressively.
The fund manager in the first period collects the inflow f˜1 and then decides on his
trade. As for the trader, there are two factors that play into the determination
of the optimal aggressiveness θ. The choice of θ determines the first period’s
profits as well as the informativeness of the price signal. On the one hand, the
fund manager obtains a share γP of the profits in this period. On the other hand,
the full value of the increase in information that can be obtained from the price
signal accrues to the fund manager. The fund sets
θfund = argmax
θ
γPΠ(q, θ) + E1[Π(q2)|θ]. (1.32)
As we see from lemma 6, the next period’s profits are increasing in aggressiveness.
Holding some level of expected liquidity constant, the fund manager is able to
deliver a higher return in the second period with a more precise signal. This
knowledge increases his compensation through two channels: high inflows from
investors who know that the fund gained experience in the morning of period 2
and high expected profits, of which the fund receives a share γP . These channels
together let the fund capture the full expected profits at t = 2, as can be seen by
lemma 3. Thus, as in section 2, the fund manager is over-incentivised to learn.
The fund manager gives up too much profit in the first period to let his investors
and himself learn more.
However, a high amount of experimentation and therefore a high expected price
impact in the first period is anticipated by investors. The first period inflows
f˜1 depend only on the expected profit in the first period. Since the expected
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profit suffers from excessive trading, the initial inflows are small. The competi-
tive outside investors always need to break even. In the end, the fund manager
bears the costs of excessive experimentation, and his overall expected compen-
sation suffers. The fund obtains, in expectation, Π(q, θfund) + E1[Π(q2)|θfund] <
Π(q, θtrader) + E1[Π(q2)|θtrader].
The result that funds are excessively concerned with learning is quite surprising.
Consistent with reality, in my model, a high return is followed by high inflows
into the fund. Thus, at first glance, it might seem that a fund manager who
cares how investors view him would try to obtain the highest possible expected
return today to gather more flows tomorrow. This might lead to insufficient
learning, and the trades of the fund would be close to θBM to impress investors
and capture inflows. However, trades θ at t = 1 cannot change the expected
estimation of liquidity of investors and funds at t = 2. The only thing it can
influence is the precision of the signal about L. Thus, the fund chooses a strategy
with low average returns that does not deliver high returns very often. However,
if returns are high, they are very high, and it can be learned with high certainty
that the market is deep. The convexity result from lemma 5 comes into play
here. The high aggressiveness of the fund results in low average returns but
high average inflows. There is empirical evidence that indirect incentives coming
from future flows are of fundamental importance for both mutual funds and hedge
funds. For example, this is documented in Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996)
and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) for mutual funds. For hedge funds, Lim, Sensoy
and Weisbach (2015) show that future compensation from future flows matters
roughly four times as much as the direct compensation.
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1.4 Implications
1.4.1 Limits of Arbitrage
In reality, we find some investment strategies where trading based on observable
signals generates abnormal returns. These asset market anomalies do not seem
to have fully disappeared after articles about them are published and market
participants should have become aware of them (McLean and Pontiff (2015)).
For many of the anomalies, it is quite difficult to find risk-based explanations.
This raises the question of why these anomalies persist. The limits of arbitrage
have been suggested as a potential reason (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). My
model suggests that uncertain scalability could also be a reason why there is in-
sufficient trade on these anomalies to make them disappear. A leading example
may be momentum, the scalability of which practitioners and academics debate.
For example, Dimensional Fund Advisors refuses to implement a large-scale mo-
mentum strategy because the fund claims that the robustness of the strategy to
trading costs in light of the higher turn-over involved is questionable.14 The fund
clearly acknowledges the existence of momentum before trading costs. As noted
by Assness et al. (2014), the low scalability of momentum seems to be a myth.
My model indicates that uncertainty about scalability alone could lead funds to
shy away from exploiting opportunities even in a situation where the expected
scalability is quite high. I assume that the trading opportunity with uncertain
L ∈ {∆L,∆H} is one strategy in which the insider could engage. Furthermore,
I assume that the insider can, as an alternative, choose and commit to an "old"
strategy with known liquidity Lold and obtain private information about a dif-
ferent asset with dividend vold for two periods. The only difference between the
old and the new strategy is that the new strategy has uncertain liquidity.
I look at how the strategy choice differs between a trader and a fund manager.
14This is the answer they give investors when asked why they do not offer a momentum fund
(www.ifa.com/articles/momentum-factor-empirical-update).
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In the case Lold = E[L] = (1− q)∆L + q∆H , both the fund and the trader would
obviously choose the old strategy, since they like the certainty of the liquidity
regime. Let
LˆIold I ∈ {trader, fund} (1.33)
denote the cutoff liquidity of the old strategy where an insider of type I would
choose and commit to a new strategy. Clearly, a low LˆIold indicates a preference
for certainty.
Corollary 9. The fund will be more adverse to uncertainty about liquidity
Lˆtraderold > Lˆ
fund
old . (1.34)
We always have Lˆtraderold > ∆L, but we might have Lˆ
fund
old < ∆L.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The corollary shows that even though it is clear that the new strategy is more
scalable than the old one (Lˆfundold < ∆L), the fund manager may still prefer to
deploy the old strategy. The low compensation that the fund receives in the
initial period because of inefficient learning may outweigh the benefits of higher
scalability. The problem of the fund is the inability to commit to not engage in
inefficiently aggressive trades.
1.4.2 Asymmetric Flow-Performance Relationship
The profit that the manager generates before fees R˜ could be either zero (in the
case of a price impact) or positive. In the following, I find that learning results in
a convex flow-performance relationship. The return that the fund can generate is
dependent on θ. The fund can generate profits 1
2
θ with probability P(P = 1/2|θ)
or 0 with probability P(P ∈ {0, 1}|θ).
Corollary 10. Suppose θ < ∆L. The inflows f˜2 − f˜1 are convex in the profits
that the fund makes in the first period.
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Even though there are strong inflows into a fund after high performance, there
might not be any outflows following poor performance. This is because the
initial inflows were small based on anticipated experimentation and the fund’s
lack of knowledge about L. Over time, the flows are related to learning about the
fund (which type of strategy L) and also by learning by the fund. Given some
expected level of L, the second period’s inflows will be higher, since the fund has
learned and no longer has an incentive to experiment. There is a lot of empirical
evidence documenting that the flow-performance relationship is asymmetric and
convex for mutual funds (see Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tuffano
(1998)). In particular, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) show that the relationship
is more convex for young funds. This suggests that the learning explanation
given in my model could indeed be correct. Furthermore, evidence of the same
phenomenon for hedge funds is documented by Baquero and Verbeek (2013).
1.4.3 Excessive trading
Edelen, Evans and Kadlec (2007) show that for mutual funds, the scale effects are
broadly consistent with Berk and Green (2004). However, they show that funds
seem to trade well past the point at which the marginal cost of a trade is equal
to the marginal profit increase. This means that they find that mutual funds
seem to trade excessively. My model may help explain this seemingly excessive
trading.
1.4.4 Return persistence and Hedge fund closures
So far, I have maintained the assumption that the fund opens up in the interim
period. The problem of inefficient "long termism" can be overcome if the fund
can commit to remaining closed to new investment in the interim period. In
principle, hedge funds can choose to remain close to new investment. Indeed,
there is evidence that many hedge funds are closed, as shown in Yin (2015). Why
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a hedge fund would remain closed may be puzzling, since in principle, a hedge
fund could always increase its compensation by accepting more money, and the
hedge fund would not necessarily have to invest all the available funds. Further-
more, there is empirical evidence that hedge fund managers’ total compensation
grows with fund size (see Yin (2015)). If I assume that the fund could commit
to closing, the fund would always choose to do so in my model. In this case,
my model may speak to the empirical evidence that hedge funds exhibit return
persistence. A series of papers note that hedge funds exhibit persistent abnormal
performance (see Jagannatha, Malakhov and Novikov (2010) and Fung, Hsieh,
Naik and Ramadorai (2008)). The problem described in my paper should be
more relevant to new hedge funds. It may explain the finding in Aggarwal and
Jorion (2010) that hedge fund persistence is significantly stronger for new hedge
funds.15
Corollary 11. Suppose that the fund can commit to closing on the morning of
t = 2. The fund is able to implement the first-best strategy, i.e., θfund = θtrader
and is paid the expected profits of the trader. There is return persistence, i.e.,
E[R˜2|R˜1] (1.35)
is increasing in R˜1.
If the fund manager can commit to closing in the intermediate period, he would
very much like to do so. This increases the inflows that he can gather in the
first period. The initial investors are now willing to suffer subpar returns in the
first period, since they know that they will also benefit from the fund’s learning
in the next period. Since the fund manager shares both the profits and benefits
of learning in the same way, he now experiments optimally and is paid the full
expected profits.
15As one commentator from the financial industry with regards to young hedge funds that close to
new investment said, ”What you see with small or newer managers is they are engaging in strategies
that are different and new and haven’t been seen before” (NYT September 7,2011).
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1.4.5 Conclusion
This paper presents a new type of agency problem that prevails between fund
managers and investors given the way fund managers are rewarded in the real
world. I show that the short-term incentives of fund managers may result in
inefficient "long termism". In the context of an uncertain price impact, the fund
manager faces incentives to learn excessively about his trading opportunity and
the market in which he is trading. In my model, this means that, on average, he
trades too aggressively and has too great an impact on the price. I show that
the model may explain some empirical facts about the investment management
industry, such as the limits of arbitrage, excessive trading, convexity of the flow-
performance relationship and hedge fund return persistence.
It may be interesting to consider a dynamic model with more periods. Further-
more, it would be interesting to consider a more standard Kyle (85) framework, as
in Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016), with uncertain stochastic noise trade volatil-
ity and to analyse how the insider experiments over time. One could also focus
on the case of a profit-maximising trader and leave out the agency problem.
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Chapter 2
Reputation, Fund Flows and Asset
Prices
2.1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, we have experienced strong growth in the holding of
financial assets by money managers. Typical compensation schemes in the indus-
try indicate that money managers would like to impress investors and thereby
increase the assets under their management. In reality, there are frictions in the
market for asset management, as it is costly for investors to search for a new
manager (Sirri and Tufano (1998)). How convincing the results of an asset man-
agement company are to the wider universe of investors affects how many more
investors will invest with the company. This flow-performance relationship for
mutual funds is well documented in the empirical literature (Chevalier and Elli-
son (1997)). In this paper, I develop a model of an asset market and a market for
portfolio management. Endogenous flows arise from changes in a fund manager’s
reputation. I show that when the asset management market is inefficient, fund
managers’ incentives may result in the over-pricing of high-beta assets, which is
consistent with the empirical evidence (Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972)).
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My model features a large set of investors that receives endowments and in-
vests with fund managers. Some fund managers have better private information
about the payoff of an asset than others. The type of a fund manager is pri-
vate information. Investors use realised returns to update their opinions about
their managers. Fund managers that achieve high returns experience inflows,
while under-performing fund managers experience outflows. The more investors
switch to informed funds, the smaller the benefits of switching. The size of the
inflows is related to the benefits of investing with an informed fund manager. In
a model similar to that of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), the benefit of informa-
tion is decreasing in the amount of money managed by informed fund managers.
Furthermore, I assume that it is costly for investors to search for a better fund
manager. An investor who is richer cares more about having an informed fund
and cares less about the constant cost of switching. Thus, the value of reputation
is state dependent. In the initial period, fund managers take into account the
future inflows they could receive. The state-dependent value of a reputation can
produce a high-beta asset that trades at a premium. Furthermore, assets differ
in the change in reputation they provide. In my model, an asset in short supply
will be held by few funds, which potentially provides large reputation improve-
ments. However, holding an asset in short supply is very costly in the case of
under-performance. In this case, investors in an under-performing fund would
be very inclined to switch funds. I show that in case of inefficient asset manage-
ment markets, the former effect dominates, and the smaller the asset supply, the
higher the asset price.
There is a growing literature describing the pricing of assets in the presence of
career concerns. These papers typically do not consider endogenous fund size.
Dasgupta and Prat (2006) provide a microfoundation for career concerns and
show that fund managers may have incentives to make trades that are not based
on information. In Dasgupta and Prat (2008), information aggregation in prices
with career-concerned managers is analysed. Finally, Dasgupta, Prat and Ver-
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ardo (2011) show that assets may trade at a reputational premium (discount) in
a sequential trading model. The paper that is most closely related to my paper
is that of Guerrieri and Kondor (2012). In this paper, the simplistic structure
of the asset market is similar. However, Guerrieri and Kondor (2012) make an
extreme assumption of decreasing returns to scale, as each fund manager can
only invest 1$. One of the central results of their paper reflects the impact of ca-
reer concerns on asset prices – risky assets will trade at a reputational premium
(discount). When the probability of a high payoff is high, a career-concerned
fund manager wants to hold the asset not only for the chance of a high payoff
but also for the relatively high chance of improving his or her reputation. These
preferences drive up the prices of the risky asset. In this paper, I go a step
further and explicitly model the rewarding of a good reputation with inflows. A
recent paper that shares some predictions with this paper is that of Garlenau
and Pedersen (2015). Both papers consider the market for asset managers with
search costs. In their paper, there are no reputational concerns, so the two pa-
pers consider quite different issues. Their paper focuses on the relations between
price efficiency and asset management market efficiency, fee determination and
related questions. They obtain some predictions that are similar to those in this
paper in a more standard asset pricing framework. However, they abstract from
agency problems that can distort asset prices. In contrast, this paper focuses
on the asset pricing implications of the reputational concerns of fund managers.
My model is related to the literature on reputation-based herding, which can be
traced back to Scharfstein and Stein (1990). In my paper, the fund managers
do not make sequential choices. They make their decisions in isolation. The
rewards stemming from flows depends on reputations in an endogenous form.
Under certain conditions, the asset that most funds hold will trade at a pre-
mium, whereas the opposite pattern may hold if the asset markets are inefficient.
In Vayanos and Woolley (2008), fund flows generate momentum, reversal, ampli-
fication, co-movement and lead-lag effects. Their multiple-period setting allows
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them to concentrate on different issues. In their model, flows into a single active
fund are generated by exogenous changes the active fund’s efficiency parameter.
In my model, there is a set of active funds, and fund flows are motivated by
differences in skill within a mass of fund managers. Kaniel and Kondor (2008)
introduce an exogenous convex flow performance relationship in a standard Lu-
cas economy. There is a large empirical literature testing the CAPM. Black,
Jensen, and Scholes (1972) show that the security market line is too flat rela-
tive to the CAPM. There is also some research that tries to explain the beta
anomaly. A related paper is that of Karceski (2002). In his model, funds care
more about out-performing the benchmark in good times because there are more
inflows, which is similar to this paper. However, in Karcesky (2002), the flows
are completely exogenous, whereas in this paper, the flows are endogenous and
create the anomaly. This provides new predictions about the beta anomaly; for
example, it is stronger when asset management markets are less efficient. Baker,
Bradley, and Wurgler (2011) posit benchmarking as a possible explanation for the
phenomenon. Here, irrational investors demand high-beta assets, and fund man-
agers and benchmarking create the limits of arbitrage, resulting in the anomaly.
In a related paper, Buffa, Vayanos, and Woolley (2013) develop a theoretical
framework where benchmarking amplifies the high-beta/low-return anomaly. In
their model, managers wanting to reduce deviation from a benchmark have in-
centives to buy more volatile (high-beta) stocks because these stocks explain a
large share of overall market volatility. In contrast to these paper, in my model,
there is no benchmarking. Frazzini and Peddersen (2013) provide an alternative
explanation for the beta anomaly. In their paper, leverage-constrained investors
hold high-beta stocks, since they would like high expected returns and cannot
move on the capital market line because they are constrained. The result is that
high-beta stocks have low alphas. However, there is some empirical evidence
that the relationship between beta and expected returns is almost flat (Baker,
Bradley, and Wurgler (2011)). The mechanism I discuss in the present paper
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may help explain this anomaly. In the empirical part of their paper, Frazzini and
Peddersen confirm that the results of Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) hold 40
years later not only for stocks but also for other asset classes. Furthermore, Hong
and Sraer (2014) generate the anomaly through disagreement about market fun-
damentals. The disagreement is higher for high-beta stocks, since those are more
sensitive to market movements. In combination with short-sale constraints, this
leads to high prices for these stocks driven by the demand of optimists.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, I illustrate the
main mechanism of the paper using an example. In Section 3, I present the main
model. In Section 4, I solve for the equilibrium. In Section 5, I relate my model
and results to the empirical evidence and conclude. All proofs are included in
the appendix.
2.2 The main mechanism in a nutshell
This section illustrates the main mechanism of this paper and shows how it
relates to the previous literature on asset prices and career concerns. Suppose
there is a large mass of risk-neutral funds that can invest in a risk-less asset
with exogenous return R or in a risky asset that gives a dividend v = 1 with
probability (1 − q) and v = 0 otherwise. Let us suppose that for the market
to clear, these managers have to be indifferent between the two assets. Let me
introduce a reward W , which funds can obtain if they pick the right asset. The
reward is related to the funds’ reputation they get from picking the right asset.
Let γ denote the share of profits funds receive. Suppose that W is a constant ;
then, we need the price P to clear the market:
γ
1− q
P
+ (1− q)W = γR + qW. (2.1)
The left hand side of (2.1) is the expected payoff of a mananger who invests in
the risky asset. The right hand side is the expected payoff of a manager who
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invests in the risk-less asset. These two expected payoffs should be equal to make
uninformed fund managers indifferent.
In Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo (2011) and Guerrieri and Kondor (2012), the
reputational premium (discount) derives from the fact that when q < (>)1/2,
P > (<)1−q
R
. It is clear that when q = 1/2, there is no reputational premium.
However, in reality, it is unlikely that W is a constant. It may depend on
the state of the world. A fund manager’s compensation depends on the assets
under management. Following good performance, they manage to improve their
reputations, which might in turn generate inflows. In my model, I focus on the
case when q = 1/2 to shut down the familiar reputational premium effect, but the
price distortion stems from the fact that the reward W may be state dependent.1
The price equation is then
γ
1
2
1
P
+
1
2
E[W |v = 1] = γR + 1
2
E[W |v = 0]. (2.2)
The risky asset may then trade at a premium (discount) when
E[W |v = 1] > (<)E[W |v = 0]. (2.3)
I call this the flow premium. First, the same reputation may lead to different in-
flows in different states of the world. For example, it is possible that a reputation
is more valuable in good times. In these times, investors have more money to
invest, and they will invest with reputed funds. Second, how many other funds
invest in the risky asset may matter. If the asset is in low supply in equilibrium,
fewer funds will do so. Thus, out-performing by buying the asset induces a large
improvement in reputation and high inflows. These flows come from the large
set of all other funds, so the outflows will be distributed among a large set of
funds and might be small.
To analyse this mechanism, I develop a model where investors face a decision to
1This reward should denote the difference in the expected utility of a fund manager who was right
compared to that of a fund manager who was wrong.
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either invest in a new fund or stay with their current fund. Investors will invest
in funds that have out-performed until the expected utility of doing so is equal
to that of staying with the current fund. The endogenous asset prices will make
the decreasing returns to scale endogenous, so the flows into active funds will
be endogenous. Unlike the seminal paper by Berk and Green (2004), decreas-
ing returns to scale do not come from capacity constraints at the fund level but
from capacity constraints at the industry level. In my model, what matters is
the aggregate amount of money managed by informed active funds. This paper
combines rational flows and an asset market model with career-concerned fund
managers.
Figure 2.1: Timeline of the model
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2.3 The Model
I consider a two-period economy with time t ∈ {1, 2}, where there is a round of
trading in each period t. There is a risky asset and a risk-free asset. Each period
can be divided into morning and afternoon. Everyone is risk-neutral.
There is a unit mass of investors. In each period, each investor obtains an
endowment in the morning. Furthermore, before each trading round, investors
invest with fund managers. The investors can only consume in the afternoon.
The only way for investors to transfer their endowment to the afternoon is by
investing with a fund manager. The endowment process represents a state of
the economy in which a large endowment represents good times when the overall
economy is doing well. In the initial period, each investor receives one dollar
e1 = 1 (2.4)
and in the second period they each receive the same e2, where
P(e2 = 1 + δ) = 1/2 P(e2 = 1− δ) = 1/2. (2.5)
I assume that δ ∈ (0, 1).
There is a unit mass of fund managers2. A small mass θ of these fund managers
is informed, and the type of the fund is private information. Fund managers
are paid through an exogenous contract; they simply receive a share of the fund
γ > 0. If a fund manager manages α dollars at the beginning of the period and
the return realised is R˜, his compensation in the afternoon of a period is3:
αγR˜. (2.6)
The goal of fund managers is to maximise the fee they earn from investors.4 The
2Sometimes referred to simply as "funds".
3By returns, I mean gross returns.
4The assumption on the contract perfectly aligns the incentives of fund managers and investors in
the absence of fund flows and reputation concerns.
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Figure 2.2: Summary of flows in the model
investors and the fund managers discount future payoffs at a rate ω > 0.5
Whenever investors want to find a new fund manager, they incur a fixed search
cost c > 0. The cost c of switching funds can be interpreted in a number of
ways. It could represent the effort cost of becoming informed about the fund’s
performance relative to other funds, which seems reasonable for retail investors.
It could also represent due diligence for new funds. In reality, due diligence is
a costly and sometimes lengthy process, consisting of evaluating various aspects
of the asset management firm. Garlenau and Pedersen (2015) make a similar
5The discounting is between the time periods t. There is no discounting from the afternoon to the
morning of a period.
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assumption in their paper.6 We could also think of c as simply a measure of
investor "responsiveness" to fund performance.
The fund managers can invest in an asset that pays aa dividend of vt ∈ {1 −
d, 1+d} in the afternoon of each period t. I assume that d ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore,
there is a risk-less asset with a perfectly elastic supply, which gives an exogenous
risk-free return R. I assume
P(vt = 1 + d) = 1/2. (2.7)
I assume
P(e2 = 1 + δ|v1 = 1 + d) = β P(e2 = 1 + δ|v1 = 1− d) = 1− β (2.8)
where β ∈ (0, 1). The risky asset has a nominal supply b > 0.7 The informed
fund managers have perfect private information about vt in the morning of each
time period t.
An asset with a high β in my model has a payoff that is positively correlated
with good times in the overall economy. That is, if the asset has a high payoff,
most of the time, investors receive a large endowment (e2 = 1 + δ) in the next
period. The interpretation is that the investors also have other non-modelled
investments that resemble a "market portfolio". Following up high returns of
this portfolio, they have a lot of money to invest with fund managers next period
(e2 high).
There is a mass of noise traders who have a total dollar amount ∆ > 0 to invest.
6 In my model, paying the cost c allows investors to match with a new fund, but in contrast
to Garlenau and Pedersen (2015), it does not inform investors about the type of fund (informed or
uninformed). The only information the investors have to update their opinions about the funds is
past performance. Furthermore, in contrast to their model, I have no need for "noise allocators". All
investors are the same, have the same search cost c, and are rational.
7As in Guerrieri and Kondor (2012), the nominal supply can be interpreted as a mass of b one
period-lived borrowers that supply inelastically assets to finance one unit of consumption. These
borrowers repay a low amount in the afternoon with probability 1/2.
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I assume that ∆˜t dollars are invested in the risky asset. I assume
∆˜t ∈ U [0,∆]. (2.9)
Here U denotes the uniform distribution. The realisation of ∆˜t is independent
of everything else and is not observed by investors or fund managers. The noise
traders become uninformed funds in the next period.8
The asset markets are similar to those in the model of Guerrieri and Kondor
(2012).9 In the morning of each period, all funds submit demand schedules to
an auctioneer. I restrict the fund managers to three choices: they can invest all
funds in the risky asset d = 1, they can fully invest in the risk-free asset d = 0, or
they can be indifferent between the two options d = {0, 1}. A demand schedule
is a map d : R+ → {0, 1, {0, 1}}, for each price p ≥ 0 it contains a demand. The
auctioneer collects the demand schedules and selects the price. The managers
receive either the risky asset only or the risk-free asset only.10
2.3.1 Optimisation problems
I denote by at := (∆˜t, vt, et) the realisation of the shocks to the model at time
t. I define Pt(at) as the equilibrium price function at time t. In our rational
expectations equilibrium, both uninformed and informed managers will maximise
their expected utility conditional on the prices they observe. Thus, at each time t,
uninformed managers choose the demand schedules that maximise their expected
utility:
8The noise traders could represent emerging funds and have ∆ investors that may move funds in
the next period. However, the ∆ investors may mistake their noise trader for an informed fund.
9The way I define the portfolio choice problem makes simplifying assumptions. There are no short
sales, and there is no possibility to take on leverage. Both of these assumptions seem consistent with
reality when we think about mutual funds.
10This assumption is less restrictive then it may seem. Under reasonable assumptions regarding
out-of-equilibrium beliefs, risk-neutral fund managers would never want to diversify.
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V Ut (αt) = max
dt∈{0,1,{0,1}}
Et[γαtR˜t + ωV Ut+1(αt+1)|Pt] (2.10)
where the informed managers face the same problem, except that they can con-
dition on vt. Here, V Ut is the expected utility of an uninformed fund, and we
have V Ut = 0∀t ≥ 3 (since the model has only two periods).
I will focus on a symmetric equilibrium where all informed fund managers and
all uninformed fund managers submit the same demand schedules. Thus, there
are two distinct demand schedules. There are the demand schedules for informed
funds dIt (Pt, vt) and the schedules for uninformed funds dUt (Pt). The auctioneer
then sets an equilibrium price Pt to satisfy the market-clearing condition. Let
Xt(dt, at) denote the equilibrium probability of obtaining the risky asset given
the realisation of at and demand schedule dt. Let θ˜t denote the total money
managed by informed funds at time t. Then, market clearing requires
(et − θ˜t)Xt(dUt (Pt), at) + θ˜tXt(dIt (Pt, vt), at) + ∆˜t = b. (2.11)
Since all the funds in the model are infinitesimal, by the law of large numbers,
(et − θ˜t)Xt(dUt (Pt), at) is the total dollar amount of the risky asset held by unin-
formed funds, and θ˜tXt(dIt (Pt, vt), at) is the amount held by the informed funds.
An allocation X(dt, at) for a given demand schedule dt is consistent with a man-
ager’s demand if and only if ∀at X(1, at) = 1, X(0, at) = 0, X({0, 1}, at) ∈ [0, 1].
Since the investors all have to match with a fund in the first period and the type
of a fund is unkown to investors, the investor optimisation problem before t = 1
is trivial. Each investor matches with a fund randomly. An investor observes the
performance of his fund after t = 1 and can choose to pay the matching cost c to
invest in a new fund. Each investor i has two options. The investor can search
for a new fund and invest with the fund that has the best reputation. In this
case, the investor incurs the cost c.11
11Given risk neutrality and infinitesimal investors, it is clear that an investor will always invest all
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The investor can also choose to stay with his current fund throughout the period
and the game. In this case, the investor does not incur search costs. In an
equilibrium, no investor can gain by changing their switching decision.
2.3.2 Equilibrium concept
I summarise the equilibrium concept in the following definition.
Definition 12. A rational expectations equilibrium constitutes demand sched-
ules dIt (Pt, vt), dUt (Pt) a price function Pt(at) ∈ [1−dR , 1+dR ], an allocation function
Xt(dt, at) and investors investment decisions such that for each t ∈ {1, 2}:
1.) For each realisation at, a price Pt such that the asset market clears, i.e.,
(et − θ˜t)Xt(dUt (Pt), at) + θ˜tXt(dIt (Pt, vt), at) + ∆˜t = b. (2.12)
2.) The demand schedules solve the informed and uninformed managers’ optimi-
sation problem (2.10);
3.) The asset allocation is consistent with the demand schedules;
4.) The investors beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ Rule on the equilibrium path;
5.) The investors fund-switching decisions are optimal.
2.3.3 Assumptions
The following two assumptions make sure that there are no corner solutions. I
assume that there exists a real number κ ∈ (1/2, 1) such that
b/(1 + ∆) ∈ (1/2, κ) ∆
θ
∈
(
1 + δ,
1− δ
κ
)
. (2.13)
I assume that δ and κ are small enough that this interval is non-empty. I assume
for c
c ∈
(
0, (1− (1 + δ)θ
∆
)
(1− δ)(1− γ)θdR
2b
)
. (2.14)
of his or her money in one of the funds. Hence, it is no restriction to assume this.
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Furthermore, I assume
2∆ < min (b, 1− δ − b) (2.15)
and for the discount factor ω
ω <
θ
∆
d
d+ 1
. (2.16)
I assume that all these assumptions hold throughout the paper in all sections. I
say that a fund makes the right decision when the fund fully invests in asset that
makes the higher return ex post. Thereby, a fund maximises the returns possible
given the investment options.
2.4 Equilibrium
2.4.1 Price function
Let θ˜t denote the mass of of money managed by informed funds at time t.
The next definition introduces the asset market equilibrium I will focus on in my
model. Let the random variable zt denote the total dollar demand for the risky
asset of noise traders and informed managers
zt = ∆˜t + θ˜t1vt=1+d. (2.17)
.
Definition 13. A simple equilibrium is a rational expectations equilibrium in
which at time t ∈ {1, 2} there exist the following revealing equilibrium regimes:
If zt ∈ [0, θ˜t), then Pt = 1−dR .
If zt ∈ (∆, θ˜t + ∆], then Pt = 1+dR .
In the revealing, regimes fund managers submit dI(Pt, vt) = dU(Pt) = {0, 1}.
There exists an unrevealing equilibrium regime:
If zt ∈ [θ˜t,∆], then Pt = Pˆt,
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where Pˆt is the price that makes it optimal for uninformed fund managers to
submit dU(Pˆt) = {0, 1}, and informed fund managers submit dI(Pˆt, vt) = 1vt=1+d.
The main goal is to find the price Pˆ1 such that a simple equilibrium exists. It
is clear that Pˆ2 = E[v]/R = 1/R, since there are no more reputational concerns
at t = 2 and no information about v2 is transmitted in an unrevealing regime12.
The above definition implies that an uninformed manager employed at t = 2
always has expected returns of R and that uninformed fund managers are the
marginal investors. Hence, I simply have:
E[V U2 (α2)] = α2γR (2.18)
where α2 denotes the fund’s assets under management at time t = 2 (at t = 1,
each fund has 1 dollar). Hence, the expected utility of uninformed fund managers
depends on the assets under management in a simple linear way. It is important
to note that informed fund managers always make the right decision in a simple
equilibrium. It is clear that θ˜1 = e1θ = θ, since e1 = 1.
Lemma 14. In a simple equilibrium, suppose we had an unrevealing regime at
t = 1. Let pi denote the reputation of the out-performing funds of the first period.
In the second period, the expected per-dollar benefit of investing with one of those
funds is given by:
Π(θ˜2) = (1− γ)pi1
2
dR
∆− θ˜2
∆
. (2.19)
Then, a manager who does not make the right decision is uninformed with prob-
ability one. A manager who makes the right decision is informed with probability
pi =
θ
b
if v1 = 1 + d pi =
θ
1− b+ ∆ if v1 = 1− d. (2.20)
After a revealing regime, no investor will switch.
12That this is the case will be shown in the proof of proposition 16
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2.4.2 Investor flows
Investors compare the expected benefit of changing their fund to staying after
the first period. It is obvious that no investor will shift into an underperforming
active fund, since such a fund is certainly uninformed. The first term in (2.19)
reflects the fees. The probability to match with an informed fund is given by pi.
In this case, the expected benefit is 1
2
dR but only the in case of an unrevealing
regime, which will happen with probability ∆−θ˜2
∆
. The probability that informed
managers can exploit their informational advantage is decreasing in the total
amount of money they manage.
Let me analyse the possible flows after t = 1. Inflows will depend on the wealth
of investors after t = 1. In an interior equilibrium, the marginal investor is
indifferent between switching fund and not switching. This means
e2Π(θ˜2) = c. (2.21)
The equation results in the marginal utility of switching being equal to the
marginal cost of switching. The assumptions make sure that we always have
an interior equilibrium. The next lemma looks at the assets under management
αt at the fund-manager level. It is clear that α1 = 1 for all funds. α2 depends
on the performance of a fund manager and on the outcomes of the endowment
process and the asset markets.
In a simple equilibrium, suppose we had an unrevealing regime at t = 1 and let
pi denote the reputation of the out-performing funds in the first period. At time
t = 2, we have the following:
Lemma 15. In a simple equilibrium, suppose we had an unrevealing regime at
t = 1 and let pi denote the reputation of the out-performing funds in the first
period. At time t = 2, we have the following: The assets under management α2
of out-performing funds are given by
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∆θ
(1− 2 c
(1− γ)e2pidR). (2.22)
In the case in which the risky asset was the right choice, the expected assets
under management α2 of underperforming funds are given by e2 − b1−b+∆(∆θ (1−
2 cb
(1−γ)e2θdR) − e2). In the case in which the risk-free asset was the right choice,
the expected assets under management α2 of underperforming funds are given by
e2 − 1−b+∆b (∆θ (1− 2 c(1−b+∆)(1−γ)e2θdR)− e2).
This lemma shows that the per-fund assets under the management of funds that
out-perform are increasing in their reputation pi. The level of reputation matters
only in cases with search frictions c, as can be seen from (2.22). Furthermore,
the assets under management of an out-performing fund are increasing in e2, as
can be seen from (2.22).
2.4.3 Flow premium
Suppose that we have an unrevealing equilibrium at t = 1. In this case, unin-
formed fund managers should be indifferent between the two assets. Thus, we
need the expected utility of both investments to be equal. They obtain their
share of the returns in this period and take into account the expected assets
under management in the next period in various cases, since by (2.18), their ex-
pected utility depends on them. I denote by ψ ∈ {V, S} the realised investment
of the fund manager.13 We have ψ = V in the case in which the manager is al-
located the risky asset. In order for the fund manager to be indifferent between
the two assets, we need:14
13Suppose that the allocation is consistent. If a fund submits d ∈ {0, 1}, the realised investment is
V or S for sure. If a fund submits d = {0, 1}, ψ is random and equal to V with probability X(d, a).
14This equation resembles (2.2) from the introduction. The microfoundation ofW would be E[W |v =
1] = E[α2|ψ = V, v1 = 1]R− E[α2|ψ = S, v1 = 1]R
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γE[v]/Pˆ1 + ωγE[α2|ψ = V ]R = γR + ωγE[α2|ψ = S]R. (2.23)
Thus, I obtain (noting that E[v] = 1)
Pˆ1 =
1
R (1 + ω(E[α2|ψ = S]− E[α2|ψ = V ])) . (2.24)
The uninformed funds care about the rewards in terms of assets under manage-
ment in the next period given the possible outcomes. We see the expected assets
under management in lemma 14. In this model, it can be seen that the risky asset
trades at a premium (discount) when the expected assets under management in
the next period are higher (lower) for the risky asset compared to the risk-free
asset. If
E[α2|ψ = S]− E[α2|ψ = V ] < 0, (2.25)
then the risky asset trades at a premium. This is what I call the flow premium.
It is important to distinguish this flow premium from the reputational premium
identified in previous studies, such as those of Guerrieri and Kondor (2012) and
Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo (2011). In these papers, the effect of price changes
on the probability of a high payoff was the focus. The reputational premium in
these papers leads the risky asset to trade at a discount (premium) relative to the
risk-neutral benchmark for a high (low) probability of v = 1− d, since the high
probability of a reputational loss makes uninformed managers unwilling to invest
in an asset that has a high chance of underperforming. I shut down this effect by
setting the probability to 1/2. In my paper, the premium stems from inflows that
differ based on the state of the world, although the states are equally likely. The
flow premium stems from two parts. The difference in assets under management
after having improved reputation E[α2|ψ = S, v1 = 1−d]−E[α2|ψ = V, v1 = 1+d]
and the difference after having lost reputation
E[α2|ψ = S, v1 = 1+d]−E[α2|ψ = V, v1 = 1−d]. The sum of the two determines
the sign of the premium.
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Proposition 16. There exists a simple equilibrium, and Pˆ1 is given by (2.24)
and Pˆ2 = 1/R.
2.5 Implications
2.5.1 The Beta Anomaly
The price is given by (2.24). When the risky asset has β close to one, this means
that almost surely a fund investing in that asset would have a good reputation
in the high-endowment state and a poor reputation in the low-endowment state.
How will the price of the risky asset depend on β? The search frictions in the
market for asset management are the key variable in this analysis.
Proposition 17. There exists a cutoff search cost cˆ such that if search frictions
are high c > cˆ then
∂E1[R1]
∂β
< 0. (2.26)
If c < cˆ then
∂E1[R1]
∂β
> 0. (2.27)
Equation (2.26) presents the main result of this paper. The higher the correlation
of the asset payoff with the realisation of the high-endowment state, the lower
the expected return of the risky asset. Contrary to most models in finance, the
fund managers’ reputational concerns result in paying a higher price for an asset
that does well in good states of the world. The β in my model effects the asset
price through two channels. First, an investor with a larger endowment cares
more about securing a good fund manager and less about the cost c. Thus, more
investors will switch, and out-performing in such a state leads to more inflows
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through this effect. Second, the total amount of flows is bounded because of
liquidity constraints. The more money managed by informed funds, the smaller
the benefit of switching to them. The larger the endowment, the more money
is already managed by informed funds before flows, and thus, there is less room
for additional inflows. In cases where c is sufficiently high, the former channel is
more important.
This result could help explain the negative relationship found in the data be-
tween alpha and expected return. Furthermore, as documented in Frazzini and
Pedersen (2014), the relationship between beta and expected returns is almost
flat during 1916-2012. Baker, Bradley and Wurgler (2011) find that the rela-
tionship becomes negative during 1968-2008. They also document that during
this time institutional ownership of equities increased substantially. The lever-
age constraints explanation of the beta anomaly is not sufficient to explain the
anomaly between beta and expected returns. A higher expected return is needed
for a leverage constrained investor to pick high-beta assets.
My model predicts that the beta anomaly should be stronger when the market for
asset management is less efficient. Search costs c may be higher for hedge funds
and funds that hold more opaque assets, since in these cases, understanding fund
performance is more difficult. This is consistent with the work of Coval, Jurek
and Stafford (2009). They show that there is evidence of mis-pricing systemic
risk in senior trenches of CDOs.
2.5.2 Asset Supply
Proposition 18. There exists a cutoff search cost ˆˆc such that if search frictions
are low
c < ˆˆc
then
∂E1[R1]
∂b
< 0 (2.28)
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if c > ˆˆc
∂E1[R1]
∂b
> 0. (2.29)
This proposition shows that when search frictions are low, the asset’s return is
decreasing in the nominal supply b. A higher nominal supply lets a fund "share
the blame" with other funds if the investment turns out to be a wrong decision.
In the case of low search frictions, this is very valuable. A smaller supply of the
asset allows a fund to potentially stand out from the masses. This is favourable
when the investment was correct. A higher c makes the search frictions more
important relative to the liquidity constraints. In the case where search frictions
are important, the level of reputation matters more, and it is more valuable to
stand out from the masses then to share the blame.
2.5.3 Asset market efficiency
The following highlights some results regarding funds performance. By price effi-
ciency at time t, I mean the probability that the asset price reveals the informed
fund managers P(Pt ∈ {1−dR , 1+dR }) = θ˜t∆ .
Proposition 19. At t = 2, the following results hold:
i) informed fund managers out-perform uninformed fund managers in expecta-
tion
ii) the higher the search cost c, the higher the expected out-performance of in-
formed fund managers
iii) investors whose fund underperformed and thus shift funds out expect over-
performance that just offsets their search cost
iv) the price efficiency is decreasing in c
v)all else equal the price efficiency is higher in good times (e2 = 1 + δ) than in
bad times (e2 = 1− δ)
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This proposition links the efficiency of the asset market to the efficiency of the
asset management market. In my model, there is room for fund manager out-
performance net of fees and return persistence as long as c > 0. For example,
Kosowski, Timmermann and White (2006) find significant net-of-fee performance
differences in mutual fund returns, and Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007) find a
similar result for hedge funds. It seems reasonable that c would be higher in the
hedge fund industry compared to the mutual fund industry. Thus, this model
predicts that performance persistence should be higher for hedge funds. This is
consistent with the empirical literature that generally finds greater performance
persistence for hedge funds.15
2.6 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of career concerns with endogenous flows. I show
that the value of a manager’s reputation can be state dependent when there
are frictions in the asset management market. This gives rise to a potential
explanation for the beta anomaly and shows why the asset supply may affect
asset pricing. An important next step in this line of research would be to consider
a model with multiple risky assets.
15These results are similar to those of Garlenau and Pedersen (2015)
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Chapter 3
Rare Events and Active
Management
3.1 Introduction
This paper seeks to understand how the amount of funds under active manage-
ment evolves over time and interacts with outcomes in financial markets. The
size of the asset management industry is changing over time but has remained
large. In recent years, there has been a significant shift from active manage-
ment to passive management. This trend accelerated after the financial crisis.
I provide a model that studies how flows both within and out from the sector
are influenced by events in financial markets. One implication of my model is
that following rare events in asset markets, the amount of funds under active
management may shrink dramatically. I show that this also results in reduced
issuance of risky assets. Furthermore, I show that the active management sector
may be large, despite a low amount of skill in the sector.
I consider a two-period model in which investors have the opportunity to invest
with fund managers or by themselves. There is a small fraction of informed
fund managers that have superior information about the payoff of an asset. The
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type of fund manager – informed or uninformed – is private information, and
investors learn about the type from returns. Thus, fund managers consider their
reputational concerns when investing in risky assets. In equilibrium, the expected
rewards in terms of reputation of risky and safe assets must be the same. This
requirement leads to a high demand for assets that are more likely to enable
managers to maintain their reputations, and few funds bet on rare events that
would provide a chance to really stand out. If a rare event – such as the default
of a highly rated bond – occurs, the amount of money under active management
may shrink. Such events result in a few fund managers obtaining ‘star’ status
and many fund managers suffering damage to their reputations. Reduction in
uncertainty in terms of who is informed surprisingly results in shrinkage of the
active management sector. In equilibrium, households have to be indifferent
between investing in active funds or by themselves. In the case in which the
money mostly goes to skilled funds, it does not take that much money until the
decreasing returns to scale at the sector level make opportunities go away.
The paper is related to a stream of research focusing on reputational concerns
and asset prices (Dasgupta and Prat (2006,2008), Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo
(2011), Guerrieri and Kondor (2012)). The paper differs because of its focus on
the amount of funds subject to active management, which the aforementioned
papers could not analyse because the investors do not not have a choice between
investing in actively managed funds or not doing so. The paper is related to
Malliaris and Yan (2015). They also get outflows out of the fund management
sector after a rare event. In their paper the reason is an aggregate loss of rep-
utation of fund managers employing a certain strategy. The mechanism differs
in my model. After a rare event, the aggregate reputation of the sector stays
constant, many fund managers lose their reputation, but some fund manager
improve their reputation substantially. The paper is also related to Berk and
Green (2004). Unlike Berk and Green (2004), in my model, there are endoge-
nous decreasing returns to scale on the industry level of the active management
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sector. Increasingly, the more funds trade on information, the more often they
reveal information and consequently reduce trading profits. Garcia and Van-
den (2009) study the size and asset pricing implications of the mutual funds
industry in a more standard competitive noisy rational expectations framework,
but their paper does not consider the reputational concerns of fund managers.
More related is the study of Pastor and Stambaugh (2012), who, in their paper,
consider the amount of funds subject to active management in a setting with
exogenous decreasing and uncertain returns to scale at the industry level. Paster
and Stambaugh study how the size of the industry evolves over time in the con-
text of learning about the aggregate skill of the industry over time. However,
since they do not explicitly model the asset markets, they are not able to link
the size of the sector to outcomes in the asset markets. Furthermore, they do
not consider the reputational concerns of fund managers. My model also further
relates to Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012), who consider a behavioural
explanation for the demand for safe assets and the decreased issuance of such
assets as a result of low returns due to neglected risks. My model makes similar
predictions in a rational framework.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, I present the
model. In Section 3, I solve for the equilibrium. Then, in section 4, I analyse the
results of my model. All proofs are included in the Appendix.
3.2 The Model
Consider a two-period economy with t ∈ {1, 2}, where there is a round of trading
in each period t. There is no discounting between the periods. Each period has
a morning and an afternoon. Everyone is risk-neutral.
There is a large measure H of households. In each period, each of the H house-
holds is endowed $ 1 to invest in the morning, and their aim is to maximise their
consumption in the afternoon of each period. They have no private information
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and can invest either by themselves or with a fund manager.1 The matching is
random. I assume that the endowment must be fully invested in the morning
of a period and fully consumed in the afternoon of a period. There is no sav-
ing decision. The households observe the returns of the funds after each period.
There is a unit mass of fund managers. Of those fund managers, a mass θ is
informed. The type of a fund manager is private information. I call the unit
mass the active-management sector. Fund managers get paid through an exoge-
nous contract; they simply get a share of the fund γ > 0. If a fund manager
manages α dollars at the beginning of the period and the return realised is R˜,
his compensation is
αγR˜. (3.1)
The compensation is received and consumed in the afternoon of a period. There
is no discounting between the two periods. The goal of fund managers is to
maximise the fee that they earn from investors. In the above, ‘returns’ refers to
gross returns.2
For households, the benefit of investing with a fund manager is the potential to
be matched with an informed one. The drawback is the fee γ that households
must pay.
The money can be invested in two assets, a risk-free asset and a risky asset. The
risk-free asset has exogenous risk-free return R. There is a competitive financial
intermediary who has a technology to produce a risky asset that pays vt ∈ {0, 1}
with
P(vt = 0) = q. (3.2)
1Investing by themselves can be interpreted as a passive strategy. Investing with a fund manager
represents investing via active management.
2The above assumption perfectly aligns the incentives of fund managers and investors in the absence
of fund flows and reputational concerns.
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The intermediary can choose to supply a number of risky assets bt and has no
information about vt. The supply bt is chosen before each trading round in the
morning of a period t. The price at time t of the asset Pt will be determined
in equilibrium and may depend on the supply choice bt. The informed fund
managers receive perfect private information about vt in the morning of a period.
Households, the intermediary and uninformed fund managers only know q. I
assume that households by themselves cannot hold risky assets.3 The only method
for households to invest in a risky asset is through fund managers.4
There is a mass of noise traders who have a total dollar amount ∆ > 0 to invest
and are of the same size as the funds. I assume that in each period, ∆˜t dollars
are to be invested in the risky asset.5 I assume
∆˜t ∈ U [0,∆]. (3.3)
The noise traders become uninformed funds with investors in the next period.6
The realisation of ∆˜t is independent of everything else and is not observed by
households and fund managers.
The asset markets are similar to the model in Guerrieri and Kondor (2012). There
is an auctioneer that collects the demand schedules, selects the equilibrium price
and allocates assets to clear the market. In the morning of each period, all funds
submit demand schedules to the auctioneer. I restrict the fund managers to
three choices: they can invest completely in the risky asset (d = 1), they can
fully invest in the risk-free asset (d = 0), or they can be indifferent to the two
3This assumption is not essential for the results of the paper. For structured products such as
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), the assumption seems realistic.
4Since everyone is risk-neutral, the crucial difference between investing via a fund and by themselves
is not that the households invest risk-free by themselves; rather, it is that fund managers may be
informed, but they also charge fees. Thus, investing via a fund and by themselves can be interpreted
as active and passive investment, respectively.
5If the nominal supply of the risky asset is zero, I assume that these dollars go to the risk-free asset.
6The noise traders could represent emerging funds. This assumption is made for technical reasons.
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options (d = {0, 1}). A demand schedule is a map from R+ → {0, 1, {0, 1}}; for
each price, it specifies a demand. The auctioneer collects the demand schedules
and selects the price. The managers receive either the risky asset only or the
risk-free asset only.
3.2.1 Equilibrium definition
I assume that
θ < 1 γ <
θq(1− θ)
1 + qθ − qθ2 (3.4)
and
R
1− q
∆
θ
< H. (3.5)
The first assumption makes sure that enough money goes to the active man-
agement sector. The second assumption makes sure that some money is also
invested by households by themselves.
At each time t, each of the households in H wants to maximise their expected
utility. Household i can choose from two options, which we denote by x˜it ∈ {0, 1}.
Household i can either invest with a fund (set x˜it = 1)7 or invest on its own
(x˜it = 0). The total inflow into the active management sector at time t is then
given by
∫
H
x˜it = x˜t. The households can base their decision on the observed
returns after t = 1.
Let us denote by at := (∆˜t, vt) the realisation of the shocks to the model at time
t. Let us denote by bt the choice of supply of the financial intermediary. Let
us define as Pt(at, bt) the equilibrium price function at time t. In our rational
expectations equilibrium, both uninformed and informed managers will max-
imise their expected utility conditional on the prices they observe. At each time
7By investing with a fund, I mean that the household invests with a fund with the highest reputation
possible. In equilibrium, no household would want to invest with a fund with a lower reputation.
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t, uninformed managers choose demand schedules to maximise their expected
utility:
V tU(αt) = max
dt∈{0,1,{0,1}}
Et[γαtR˜t + V t+1U (αt+1)|Pt] (3.6)
where αt is the dollar amount the fund manages. The informed fund managers
face the same problem except that they can also condition on vt.
I focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all informed fund managers submit
the same demand schedules and all uninformed fund managers also submit the
same demand schedules. I denote the schedules from informed funds by dIt (Pt, vt)
and those from uninformed funds by dUt (Pt). Furthermore, let me denote sched-
ules of households who invest by themselves by dHt (Pt).8 The auctioneer then sets
an equilibrium price Pt to satisfy the market clearing condition. Let X t(dt, at)
denote the equilibrium probability of receiving the risky asset given the realisa-
tion of at and demand schedule dt. Let θ˜t denote the total money managed by
informed funds at time t. Then, the following is required for the asset market to
clear:
(x˜t − θ˜t)X t(dUt (Pt), at) + θ˜tX t(dIt (Pt, vt), at) + (H − x˜t)X t(dHt (Pt), at) + ∆˜t = btPt.
(3.7)
The first term is the amount of money managed by uninformed funds multiplied
by the probability of receiving the risky asset. Thus, this is the amount of dollars
in the risky asset held by uninformed funds. Then, we have the amount held by
informed funds, households and noise traders. This must be equal to the nominal
supply of the risky asset in equilibrium.
We say an allocation X t(dt, at) for a given demand schedule d is consistent with a
managers demand if and only if ∀at X t(1, at) = 1, X t(0, at) = 0, X t({0, 1}, at) ∈
8Households are not allowed to invest in a risky asset, so dHt = 0 ⇐⇒ P(vt/Pt < R) > 0.
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[0, 1].
The intermediary needs to break even; this means that we need to have bt such
that in equilibrium at each time t,
E[Pt] =
1− q
R
. (3.8)
Then, the intermediary makes zero profit.
A rational expectation equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 20. A rational expectation equilibrium constitutes demand schedules,
a price function Pt(at, bt) ∈ [0, 1/R], a risky asset supply bt and an allocation
function X t(dt, at) such that at each time t, the following hold:
1.) for each realisation of shocks at, there is a price Pt(at, bt) such that the asset
market clears;
2.) the demand schedules solve the optimisation problems;
3.) the asset allocation is consistent with the demand schedules;
4.) the households update their opinion about their funds using Bayes’ rule;
5.) the household flows x˜t into the active-management sector are optimal;
6.) the risky asset supply bt is such that the intermediary breaks even.
3.3 Analysis
In my model, I focus on an equilibrium in which the price function takes the
following simple form. Let us define the random variable zt = θ˜tvt + ∆˜t.
Definition 21. I call a simple equilibrium a rational expectation equilibrium as
in definition 20, for which the price function at time t takes the form:
If zt ∈ (∆, θ˜t + ∆], then Pt = 1R .
If zt ∈ [θ˜t,∆], then Pt = (1− q)/R.
If zt ∈ [0, θ˜t), then Pt = 0.
Furthermore, in the unrevealing regime, where the price is Pt = (1 − q)/R, in-
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Figure 3.1: Summary of the structure of the model
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formed fund managers submit dIt = vt, and uninformed fund managers submit
indifference, dUt = {0, 1}.
Let us denote by b˜t = bt 1−qR the nominal supply of the risky asset in the unre-
vealing regime. For such an equilibrium to exist, we need
θ˜t < ∆ (3.9)
and9
∆ < b˜t b˜t < x˜t. (3.10)
In a simple equilibrium, an uninformed manager employed at t always makes an
expected return of R (this follows since it is required that they find it optimal
to be indifferent in that regime). Furthermore, we obtain that the probability of
being in an unrevealing regime at time t is given by
P(Pt =
1− q
R
) = qP(∆˜t ∈ [θ˜t,∆]) + (1− q)P(∆˜t ∈ [0,∆− θ˜t]) = ∆− θ˜t
∆
.
(3.11)
In a simple asset market equilibrium, uninformed funds are indifferent in the
unrevealing regime, and their expected return is R. The expected benefit of
having an informed manager in that regime is thus
(1− q)R/(1− q) + qR−R = qR. (3.12)
This equation represents the expected return of an informed fund manager minus
the expected return of an uninformed fund manager in the unrevealing regime.
Let us compare the expected utility benefit of a household that invests one dollar
in a fund who was correct compared with a household investing on its own. Let
9The first condition means that there is always sufficient nominal supply to satisfy the demand of
noise traders and informed fund managers in the unrevealing regime. The second ensures that there
is sufficient money to clear the markets coming from fund managers. Recall that households are not
allowed to invest in risky assets.
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θ˜t denote the money managed by informed funds at time t. Let us denote by pit
the highest reputation of funds in the market.10 The expected per dollar benefit
of investing with an active fund is
(1− γ)qRpit∆− θ˜t
∆
− γR. (3.13)
In order for the households to be indifferent, in equilibrium, the above expression
must equal zero. The flows affect the equation by affecting the mass of money
managed by informed funds, θ˜t. The first term of the equation denotes the
benefit of investing with a fund manager, which is the after-fee return benefit of
having an informed manager in the unrevealing regime (1− γ)qR multiplied by
the probability of being matched with an informed manager and the probability
of being in the unrevealing regime.
3.3.1 One-period benchmark
In order to illustrate that the results in this paper are driven solely by the rep-
utational concerns of the fund managers, I consider first a one-period model.11
Then, we can construct the following equilibrium:
Lemma 22. There exists a simple equilibrium. The size of the active manage-
ment sector is given by
x˜ =
∆
θ
(1− γ
θq(1− γ)). (3.14)
The mass of money managed by informed managers is θ˜ = θx˜. The supply choice
of the intermediary b is undetermined.12
Proof. See Appendix.
10Only these funds will receive inflows, and pit is the probability of matching with an informed fund
11I drop time subscripts because there is only one period
12The financial intermediary can choose any b such that 1−q
R
b < x˜ and 1−q
R
b > ∆
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The amount of funds invested in the active management sector depends on liq-
uidity, fees and the measure of informed fund managers.
Corollary 23.
∂x˜
∂γ
< 0
∂x˜
∂∆
> 0 (3.15)
and
∂x˜
∂θ
> 0(< 0) ⇐⇒ θ < (>)2 γ
q (1− γ) . (3.16)
The choice b of risky assets produced is undetermined.
Proof. The proof is obvious.
This benchmark has an interesting implication. It may be the case that greater
fractions of informed fund managers (higher θ) correspond to smaller active man-
agement sectors, x˜. Suppose that the fee γ is low relative to θ; this means that
in equilibrium, the before-fee advantage of investing with a fund manager must
be small to make investors indifferent. To make the before-fee advantage small,
prices have to often be revealing. This can only happen when a significant frac-
tion of funds invested are managed by informed fund managers. If θ is low, only
a small proportion of the total dollars x˜ that go to funds go to informed funds
θx˜. Thus, a very high value of x˜ is necessary to make θx˜ sufficiently large to
achieve the in-equilibrium required probability of price revelation. This explains
(3.16).
This result may be interesting when it comes to the debate why active-management
remains large in spite of the significant evidence of only few funds that are able
to beat the benchmark.
3.3.2 Two-period model
Next, I consider a two-period model. In this model, the first period is interesting
and different from the one-period model, since in that period, fund managers
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have reputational concerns. To obtain a simple equilibrium at t = 1, fund man-
agers have to be indifferent between the risky asset and the risk-free asset in
an unrevealing regime. Furthermore, the price of the risky asset needs to be
P1 =
1−q
R
. This is only possible if the expected reward in terms of future inflows
is the same for both assets.
Since everyone dies after t = 2, prices are not affected by career concerns in the
second period, and our analysis is straightforward; we thus set V 3U = V 3I = 0.
Since an uninformed fund manager makes an expected return of R in a simple
equilibrium, we obtain for a fund that has α2 dollars at time t = 2
E[V 2U (α2)] = α2γR. (3.17)
3.3.3 Investor flows
Suppose that we have a simple equilibrium; what can the households learn from
the funds’ actions at t = 1 ? Let us denote the nominal supply of the risky asset
in the unrevealing regime in the initial period by b˜1 (= b1 1−qR ) and the initial
inflow of households (or equivalently dollars) as x˜1.
Lemma 24. Suppose that an unrevealing regime occurred in a simple equilibrium
at t = 1.
A manager who does not make the right decision is uninformed with probability
one. A manager who makes the right decision when the risky asset (risk-free
asset) was the right choice ex post is informed with a probability of
pi2 =
θ˜1
b˜1
(3.18)
(pi2 =
θ˜1
x˜1 + ∆− b˜1
). (3.19)
At t = 2, all households either invest on their own or flow into one of the funds
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who made the right choice.
Proof. See Appendix.
The lemma demonstrates an intuitive result. If the nominal supply b˜1 is low, in
equilibrium, few fund managers can invest in that asset. Since all informed fund
managers choose the risky asset when it performs well, the increase in reputation
of funds buying the risky asset is then high. The next lemma considers inflows
into the active management sector in a simple equilibrium.
Lemma 25. At t = 1, the initial inflow in a simple equilibrium is given by
x˜1 =
∆
θ
(1− γ
(1− γ)qθ ). (3.20)
If at t = 1 there is a revealing equilibrium, then no household will flow in or out
of the sector. Suppose that there is an unrevealing equilibrium at t = 1.
Then, the total investment in the active management sector is given by
x˜2 =
∆
pi2
(1− γ
(1− γ)qpi2 ), (3.21)
and pi2 can take values as in lemma 24, depending on v1.
Proof. See Appendix.
The fund management sector in my model has endogenous decreasing returns to
scale at the industry level. Households will choose to flow into funds who could
increase their reputation. As more households flow in due to the endogenous
prices, I obtain decreasing returns to scale. As the skilled funds grow, it becomes
less likely that they can provide a superior return compared with households
investing on their own. The households will flow into the funds until they are
indifferent between investing on their own or choosing to invest with a fund.
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The total dollar amount managed per fund can be obtained from the fact that
there is a mass θ of informed funds (that will manage the same amount as
uninformed funds) and θ˜2 = pi2x˜1. Consequently, each fund with a positive
reputation manages pi2
θ
x˜1 dollars.13 Although an increase in the reputation of
funds (increase in pi2) does not generally lead to an increase in money invested
with the sector, an increase in reputation always increases the money invested
with an individual fund.
3.3.4 Fund manager incentives and asset prices
Suppose in the following that at t = 1 in the unrevealing regime, we have a
supply b1 of the risky asset. In a simple equilibrium we need
x˜1 > b1
1− q
R
b1
1− q
R
> ∆ x˜2 > ∆. (3.22)
Here x˜2 depends on b1 as outlined in lemma 25. For an equilibrium to exist,
uninformed fund managers must be indifferent between investing in the two assets
in the unrevealing regime. Thus,
x˜1γ
1− q
P1
+ (1− q)γR∆
θ
(1− P1b1γ
(1− γ)qθ˜1
) (3.23)
= x˜1γR + qγR
∆
θ
(1− (x˜1 − P1b1 + ∆)γ
(1− γ)qθ˜1
).
The left-hand side of the above equation denotes the expected utility of an unin-
formed fund who invests in the risky asset. The right-hand side corresponds to
the expected utility of an uninformed fund who fully invests in the risk-free asset.
The fund manager needs to be indifferent, and the financial intermediary needs
to break even; consequently, we need P1 = 1−qR . In equilibrium, it is required
that the expected reward for the two assets in terms of inflows in the future is
the same. If an asset has a low probability of being the “right” choice, then the
reputational reward must be high in case it is the right choice ex post. To achieve
13Let α2 denote the money managed per fund; then, we have θ˜2 = θα2 and θ˜2 = pi2x˜2, so α2 = pi2θ x˜1.
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indifference, we can solve (3.23) for b1 and find
b1 =
R
1− q
2 ((1− γ) q (γq − q + 1/2) θ2 + 3/2 (1− γ) (q − 1/3) γθ − 1/2 γ2) ∆
γθ2 (1− γ) .
(3.24)
Theorem 26. Suppose that b1 given by (3.24) satisfies conditions (3.22). There
exists a simple equilibrium in which the production of risky assets in the first pe-
riod is given by b1. The production of the risky asset in period 2 is undetermined.
Proof. See Appendix.
I take the limit to make the analysis more tractable and to focus on the important
aspects of the model. I define the parameters κL, κF > 0 such that
∆ = κLθ (3.25)
and
γ = κF θ. (3.26)
I have, by my assumptions, κL < H.
In the following, I keep my parameters κL, κF constant and I let the measure of
informed fund managers go to zero
θ → 0. (3.27)
In my model all of θ, γ and ∆ are naturally interpreted to be small.
We want to see the conditions under which a simple equilibrium as described
above exists. In a simple equilibrium, we need
x˜t > b˜t b˜t > 0. (3.28)
Furthermore, it must be optimal for uninformed fund managers to be indifferent
between the risky asset and the risk-free asset. Thus, (3.23) must be satisfied.
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Theorem 27. For q ≤ 1/2, there exists a simple equilibrium if and only if
κF ∈
(
q − 2q2
1− q , q
)
. (3.29)
For q > 1/2, there exists a simple equilibrium if and only if
κF ∈ (2q − 1, q) . (3.30)
The nominal supply of the risky asset in period 1 is given by
b˜1 = κL(3q − 1)− κLκF + κL
κF
(q − 2q2). (3.31)
The nominal supply of the risky asset in period 2 is undetermined.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the limit case the conditions on κF are easy to find such that a simple equi-
librium exists.14
3.4 Implications
We will distinguish two kinds of assets, safe assets,
q < 1/2, (3.32)
and lottery tickets,
q > 1/2. (3.33)
3.4.1 Equilibrium level of risky asset holding
The fraction of funds holding the risky asset is given by b˜1
x˜1
.
14The limit case also makes clear that there are parameters with θ,∆, γ close to zero so that condi-
tions (3.22) are satisfied and a simple equilibrium exists away from the limit.
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Proposition 28. The holding of the risky asset is given by
b˜1
x˜1
=
q(κF + 1− 2q)
κF
. (3.34)
For q < 1/2, we have
b˜1
x˜1
∈ (1− q, 1), (3.35)
and this is decreasing in κF . We have for q = 1/2 that
b˜1
x˜1
= 1/2. (3.36)
For q > 1/2, we have
b˜1
x˜1
∈ (0, 1− q), (3.37)
and this is increasing in κF .
Proof. See Appendix.
Suppose that the we have a lottery ticket (q > 1/2). In this case the fear of
losing reputation is high when investing in the risky asset. Thus, the risky asset
must provide a high reward in terms of reputation in case it turns out against
the odds have a high return. In this case relatively few uninformed funds will
hold the risky asset. Suppose that the risky asset is safe (q < 1/2). Now most
uninformed funds will hold the risky asset and a few uninformed funds will bet
on the "rare disaster". If the latter turn out to be right, they will have a very
high reputation and be rewarded with big inflows.
An example of such an episode could be the subprime market collapse in 2006.
A large majority of fund managers lost a lot money as a result of that event.
However, there was a small set of fund managers, including John Paulson and
Greg Lippman, that were betting on the possibility of a housing market crash.
Such a crash was considered an unlikely event at the time. Consequently, these
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Figure 3.2: Asset holdings
fund managers made huge profits and gained widespread recognition. As an
additional reward, these funds received large inflows by new investors into their
funds.
As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the asset management sector is more concentrated in
one asset the lower the relative fee level κF . The funds that lose their reputation
by investing in the wrong asset get zero assets under management in the next
period. Suppose for concreteness that q < 1/2. The inflows of the funds that
maintain a positive reputation depends on the level of their reputation. If κF is
low, the inflows are not very sensitive to reputation, thus the reputation increase
in the event when the risky asset defaults (which happens with q < 1/2) must
be very high to induce funds to invest in the risk-free asset. The result is that
for low κF only very few funds bet on default and invest in the risk-free asset.
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3.4.2 The evolution of the amount of funds under active management
The growth of the active management sector is given by
x˜2
x˜1
. (3.38)
In the next proposition, I analyse how the size of the sector grows depending on
market outcomes.
Proposition 29. Suppose that we had an unrevealing regime period 1. If there
is no default in the initial period (v1 = 1), we get
x˜2
x˜1
=
(κF − 2 q) q2 (κF − 2 q + 1)
κF (κF − q) . (3.39)
If there is a default in the initial period (v1 = 0), we obtain
x˜2
x˜1
=
(1− q) (κF q − 2 q2 − κF + q) (κF − 2 q)
κF (q − κF ) . (3.40)
Suppose that we have a safe asset q < 1/2. Then we get for v1 = 1
lim
κF→ q−2q21−q
x˜2
x˜1
= 1 (3.41)
and for v1 = 0, we have
lim
κF→ q−2q21−q
x˜2
x˜1
= 0. (3.42)
Proof. See Appendix.
Suppose that the asset is quite safe (q < 1/2). This proposition shows that for
an active management sector of significant size (κF ≈ q−2q21−q ), there will be a
major outflow of the active management sector following a disappointing return
(v1 = 0). This happens although everyone understands that going forward,
another comparably disastrous event is still very unlikely. The reason is that in
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the sector will be quite concentrated in the risky asset in this case (as illustrated
in Figure 3..2). Of the few funds that survive a high fraction is informed. Thus,
with the same logic as in the one-period model (3.16), the size of the sector is
going to be very small.
As we see from (3.42), the largest active management sectors vanish in the most
extreme form following a rare disaster. Furthermore, in this case, there is a sharp
decline in the issuance of risky assets. Since b˜1 ≈ x˜1 for low q, by proposition
28 and b˜2 < x˜2. This result could be related to the idea that the growth of
asset backed commercial paper was fuelled by the demand of money market
funds which were reaching for yield. After the financial crisis demand by money
market funds dried up and the commercial paper market collapsed (Kacperczyk
and Schnabl, 2010).
What if we have a lottery ticket?
Proposition 30. Suppose q > 1/2 and v1 = 1
lim
κF→2q−1
x˜2
x˜1
= 0, (3.43)
and if v = 0,
lim
κF→2q−1
x˜2
x˜1
= 1. (3.44)
Proof. See Appendix.
The results for the lottery ticket are symmetric to the case with a safe asset.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a model to analyse the time evolution in the amount of
funds under active management. The size of the sector depends on the reputation
of fund managers. A rare-event such as a surprisingly low return for a risky asset
reveals the low skill of many fund mangers and results in shrinkage of the sector.
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Future research could seek to develop a more dynamic model with an infinite
number of periods.
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Chapter 4
APPENDIX
4.1 Proofs of Chapter 1
4.1.1 Proof of proposition 2 (see page 22)
Proof. This follows from the argument in the main text.
4.1.2 Proof of lemma 3 (see page 32)
Proof. Let me first solve the model when I have a trader, i.e., I = trader.
The trader chooses her optimal demand, and I assume v = 1 in the proof (the
other case is symmetric). It is clear that a market order x˜ < 0 cannot be optimal.
Furthermore, the trader always makes zero profit with a market order x˜ > ∆H .
Let us write x˜ = θ. I will distinguish between two possible ranges of θ. There
are two possibilities: θ < ∆L and θ > ∆L. For the high values of θ, the trader
will always reveal her information in case of L = ∆L. Thus, the traders’ problem
is
max
θ∈[0,∆H ]
Π(q, θ) = max
θ∈[0,∆H ]
E[θ(v − P )|x˜ = θ, v = 1] (4.1)
= qθE[(1− P )|x˜ = θ, L = ∆H ] + (1− q)θE[(1− P )|x˜ = θ, L = ∆L].
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This can be written as
max
θ∈[0,∆H ]
Π(q, θ) = max
θ∈[0,∆H ]
1θ≤∆Lf(θ) + 1θ>∆Lg(θ). (4.2)
I thus have
f(θ) = q
∆H − θ
∆H
θ(1− 1/2) + (1− q)∆L − θ
∆L
θ(1− 1/2) (4.3)
and
g(θ) = q
∆H − θ
∆H
θ(1− 1/2). (4.4)
The function 1θ≤∆Lf(θ) + 1θ>∆Lg(θ) is continuous.
The function f has a global maximum at θBM = 1/2 ∆H ∆L∆Lq+(1−q)∆H . Furthermore, g
is strictly decreasing in θ for θ > ∆H/2, since g′(θ) = 1/2 q(−2 θ+∆H)∆H . Since ∆L >
∆H/2, g is strictly decreasing in θ in the relevant range for θ ∈ (∆L,∆H ]. Since,
by continuity, f(θBM) > f(∆L) = g(∆L) > g(θ)∀θ ∈ [∆L,∆H ] and f(θBM) >
f(θ)∀θ, I find that θBM is the optimal order. All the other results follow from
plugging in the optimal θ and I obtain expected profits of Π(q) = ∆H ∆L
(8−8q)∆H+8 ∆L q .
The case v = 0 is symmetric, with x˜ = −θBM , so the symmetric conjecture is
correct and x˜ = (−1)v+1θBM .
Let us now assume that I = fund
I solve the game starting in the afternoon. Given some inflows f˜ and some
contract γM , γP , the fund chooses θ to maximise his expected compensation,
which is given by
γM f˜ + γP f˜(E[R˜|θ]− 1). (4.5)
The only term that depends on θ is given by E[R˜|θ]. It is clear that the fund
receives the highest possible expected return with the same market order as the
trader, so θfund = θBM . The expected profits that the fund makes are then given
by Π(q).
In the morning, I have the following: Given our contract with γM and γP , house-
holds will flow into the fund until the expected return is equal to the outside
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option 1, so the following equation needs to be satisfied
f˜ − γM f˜ + (1− γP )Π(q)
f˜
= 1. (4.6)
This yields f˜ = 1/8 1−γP
γM
Π(q). The fund is paid γM f˜ + γP f˜(E[R˜|θfund] − 1) =
Π(q).
4.1.3 Proof of corollary 4 (see page 34)
Proof. Let me first show that the trader is less aggressive when uncertain about
L. If the trader knew that L = q∆H + (1 − q)∆L by lemma 3, we would an
optimal θ = 1/2 ∆H q + 1/2 (1− q) ∆L. I see that
1/2
∆H ∆L
q∆L + (1− q) ∆H < 1/2 ∆H q + 1/2 (1− q) ∆L (4.7)
⇐⇒ q (∆H −∆L)
2 (1− q)
(2 ∆H − 2 ∆L) q − 2 ∆H < 0. (4.8)
The inequality follows from rearranging, and the expression is obviously negative.
From here, it is clear that Π(q) = 1/4 θBM < 1/4(1/2 ∆H q+ 1/2 (1− q) ∆L), so
the profits are smaller when the insider is uncertain.
4.1.4 Proof of lemma 5 (see page 34)
Proof. The expected profit is given by ∆H ∆L
(8−8q)∆H+8 ∆L q by lemma 3. The second
derivative of the expected profit with respect to q is given by
Π(q)′′ = 2
∆H ∆L (8 ∆H − 8 ∆L)2
((8− 8q) ∆H + 8 q∆L)3
> 0. (4.9)
Thus, we see that the profits are convex.
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4.1.5 Proof of lemma 6 (see page 37)
Proof. Suppose that the market order in the first period is x˜ = (−1)v+1θ and
θ < ∆L. In this case, the signals have the following form
P(L = ∆H |P1 = 1/2, θ) = P(L = ∆H |θ)P(P1 = 1/2|L = ∆H , θ)P(P1 = 1/2|θ)
=
q∆H−θ
∆H(
q∆H−θ
∆H
+ (1− q)∆L−θ
∆L
) > q (4.10)
and
P(L = ∆H |P1 ∈ {0, 1}, θ) =
q θ
∆H(
q θ
∆H
+ (1− q) θ
∆L
) = q∆L
∆H − q(∆H −∆L) < q.
On the other hand, if θ ∈ (∆L,∆H ] I obtain
P(L = ∆H |P1 = 1/2, θ) = 1 (4.11)
and
P(L = ∆H |P1 ∈ {0, 1}, θ) =
q θ
∆H
q θ
∆H
+ 1− q ≤ q. (4.12)
I compute that
E1[Π(q2)|θ] = P(P1 = 1/2|θ)Π(P(L = ∆H |P1 = 1/2, θ)) (4.13)
+P(P1 ∈ {0, 1}|θ)Π(P(L = ∆H |P1 ∈ {0, 1}, θ)). (4.14)
The function E1[Π(q2)|θ] is continuous on [0,∆H ] and differentiable everywhere
but at θ = ∆L.
I compute for θ < ∆L that
∂
∂θ
E1[Π(q2)|θ]
(4.15)
= 1/8
∆H
2∆L
2q2 (∆H −∆L)4 (q − 1)2(
(1− q) ∆H2 + q∆L2
) (
(−θ + ∆L) (q − 1) ∆H2 − q∆H ∆L2 + θ q∆L2
)2 > 0
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for all θ ∈ [0,∆L).
I compute that for θ > ∆L:
∂
∂θ
E1[Π(q2)|θ] = −1/8 q∆H
2 (∆H −∆L)2 (q − 1)2(
(q − 1) ∆H2 − θ∆L q
)2 < 0 ∀θ ∈ (∆L,∆H ]. (4.16)
Since for θ > ∆H , we have E1[Π(q2)|θ = ∆H ] = E1[Π(q2)|θ], a θ > ∆H cannot be
optimal. Thus, θ = ∆L maximises E1[Π(q2)|θ].
4.1.6 Proof of proposition 7 (see page 38)
Proof. The trader will choose x˜ in the first period to achieve two goals, she wants
to have high profits in the first period and have high expected profits next period.
So the trader will choose x˜ = (−1)v+1θ at time t = 1 to maximise
E1[x˜(v − P1) + Π(q2)|v, x˜]. (4.17)
Let us assume that v = 1, so x˜ = θ (the case v = 0 is completely symmetric,
with x˜ = −θ). It is clear that x˜ < 0 and x˜ > ∆H cannot be optimal.
Then, problem (4.17) can be written as
max
θ∈[0,∆H ]
1θ<∆Lf(θ) + 1θ≥∆Lg(θ). (4.18)
The function f is given by
f(θ) = q
∆H − θ
∆H
θ(1− 1/2) + (1− q)∆L − θ
∆L
θ(1− 1/2) + E1[Π(q2)|θ], (4.19)
and the function g is given by
g(θ) = q
∆H − θ
∆H
θ(1− 1/2) + E1[Π(q2)|θ]. (4.20)
I maximise over a continuous piecewise function. The first two terms of f and the
first term of g are the profits for this period. The first candidate for a maximum
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is the maximum of f(θ) for θ ∈ [0,∆L]. In the case P(L = ∆H) = q at t = 2, the
expected profit in period 2 is obtained by lemma 3:
Π(q) = 1/8
∆H ∆L
(1− q) ∆H + ∆L q . (4.21)
I see that
E1[Π(q2)|θ] = P(P1 = 1/2|θ)Π(P(L = ∆H |P1 = 1/2, θ) (4.22)
+P(P1 ∈ {0, 1}|θ)Π(P(L = ∆H |P1 ∈ {0, 1}, θ). (4.23)
I then compute
f(θ) = 1/2
qθ (∆H − θ)
∆H
+ 1/2
(1− q) (∆L − θ) θ
∆L
(4.24)
− ((∆L + (q − 1) θ) ∆H − q∆L θ)
2
8 (∆L − θ) (q − 1) ∆H2 − 8 q∆H ∆L2 + 8 q∆L2θ
(4.25)
− ((∆H −∆L) q −∆H)
2 θ(
8 ∆H
2 − 8 ∆L2
)
q − 8 ∆H2
.
This function is continuous and has no singularity for θ ∈ [0,∆L]. I also find
that f ′(θ) is continuous and has no singularity for θ ∈ [0,∆L].
I find that f ′(θ) = 0 has 3 solutions in the following set
{1/4
(
3∆H(1−q)+3 q∆L−
√
5 (∆H−∆L)2q2−6 (∆H−2/3 ∆L)(∆H−∆L)q+∆H2
)
∆L ∆H
∆H
2(1−q)+∆L2q ,
1/4
(
3∆H(1−q)+3 q∆L+
√
5 (∆H−∆L)2q2−6 (∆H−2/3 ∆L)(∆H−∆L)q+∆H2
)
∆L ∆H
∆H
2(1−q)+∆L2q ,
1/2
((q2−3 q+2)∆H2−2 q∆L (q−1)∆H+q∆L2(q+1))∆H ∆L
((q−1)∆H2−∆L2q)((q−1)∆H−q∆L)
}. The solutions are real, since the
term in the square root is positive. This can be written as
5 (∆H −∆L)2 q2 − 6 (∆H − 2/3 ∆L) (∆H −∆L) q + ∆H2
(4.26)
> 5 (∆H −∆L)2 q2 − 4 (∆H) (∆H −∆L) q + ∆H2
(4.27)
> 4 (∆H −∆L)2 q2 − 4 (∆H) (∆H −∆L) q + ∆H2 = (∆H − 2(∆H −∆L)q)2 > 0.
(4.28)
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The first inequality follows from ∆L > ∆H/2.
Let me denote the first element in the set as θtrader. Let me show that θtrader >
0. Clearly, the denominator is greater than zero. For the numerator, I have
(∆H∆L)(3∆H−3(∆H−∆L)q−
√
5 (∆H −∆L)2 q2 − 6 (∆H − 2/3 ∆L) (∆H −∆L) q + ∆H2)
> (∆H∆L)(3∆H − 3(∆H −∆L)q −
√
∆2H − 2∆H(∆H −∆L) + (∆H −∆L)2q2)
= (∆H∆L)(3∆H − 3(∆H −∆L)q − (∆H − (∆H −∆L)q))
= 2∆H∆L(∆H − (∆H −∆L)q) > 0.
For the last element in the set, I see 1/2 ((
q2−3 q+2)∆H2−2 q∆L (q−1)∆H+q∆L2(q+1))∆H ∆L
((q−1)∆H2−∆L2q)((q−1)∆H−q∆L)
>
∆L whenever ∆L < ∆H , so it is not a candidate for an optimum. I have
f ′(0) = −1/8
(
(∆H −∆L)2 q2 +
(−3 ∆H2 + 2 ∆H ∆L + ∆L2) q + 2 ∆H2)2((
∆H
2 −∆L2
)
q −∆H2
)
((∆H −∆L) q −∆H)2
> 0
(4.29)
and
f ′(∆L) = 1/16
∆2H(∆H − 2∆L) + ∆2L(∆3H − 2∆2L)−∆2H∆3L
∆H ∆L
2
(
∆H
2 + ∆L
2
) < 0. (4.30)
I see that the numerator is negative, by ∆H < 2∆L. By continuity of f ′(θ), there
is an odd number of roots in [0,∆L]. Since there are three roots in total and
the last root of the set is not in [0,∆L], we need to have exactly one root in the
interval. It has to be θtrader, since θtrader > 0, and the second root in the set is
greater than θtrader. Thus, we have ∀θ ∈ [0,∆L]f ′(θ) > 0 ⇐⇒ θ < θtrader, and
θtrader is a candidate for our maximum.
Next, let me consider the possibility of an optimal θ ∈ (∆L,∆H ].
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Figure 4.1: The function 1θ<∆Lf(θ) + 1θ≥∆Lg(θ), with∆H = 10,∆L = 7, q = 0.5
I compute ∂g(θ)
∂θ
= 1/2 q(−2 θ+∆H)
∆H
+ ∂
∂θ
E1[Π(q2)|θ]. I note that the second term is
negative as shown in lemma 6 and I obtain
∂g(θ)
∂θ
< 0 ∀θ ≥ ∆L. (4.31)
Thus, I obtain f(θtrader) > f(∆L) = g(∆L) > g(θ)∀θ ∈ [∆L,∆H ], and the
optimal order is θtrader.
Finally, I need to show that θBM < θtrader.
Let fBM = q∆H−θ
∆H
θ(1− 1/2) + (1− q)∆L−θ
∆L
θ(1− 1/2).
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Thus, I have by lemma 3 and lemma that 6
∂
∂θ
f(θBM) =
∂
∂θ
fBMθ=θBM +
∂
∂θ
E1[Π(q2)|θ]θ=θBM > 0. (4.32)
Here, I use ∂
∂θ
fBMθ=θBM = 0 and the fact that the second term is positive by lemma
6. Furthermore, it is clear that θBM ∈ [0,∆L]. Since for θ ∈ [0,∆L], we have
f ′(θ) > 0 ⇐⇒ θ < θtrader, we obtain θBM < θtrader.
4.1.7 Proof of proposition 8 (see page 40)
Proof. I solve the game backwards.
Given some probability P(L = ∆H) = q, I know the outcome of the game at
t = 2 from lemma 3. In the afternoon of t = 1, the fund manager at t = 1
chooses an optimal trade to maximise the expected compensation over the whole
game.
Here, as usual, I assume that v = 1 in the first period, and the other case is
symmetric. Then, the fund maximises given any inflow f˜1 trade θ at t = 1. It is
clear that the optimal θ ∈ [0,∆H ].
In t = 2, the situation is as in lemma 3. Thus, given that P(L = ∆H) = q at
t = 2, the fund receives an inflow f˜2(q) = 1−γPγM Π(q). The expected compensation
of a trader will be as in the case of an informed trader Π(q) by lemma 3. Thus,
the problem in the afternoon of t = 1 reduces to
max
θ∈[0,∆H ]
E1[γM f˜1 + γP (1− P )θ + Π(q2)|θ]. (4.33)
I see that the second period does not depend on γP , and the profits of the second
period are thus weighted more. Recall the functions
f(θ) = q
∆H − θ
∆H
θ(1− 1/2) + (1− q)∆L − θ
∆L
θ(1− 1/2) + E1[Π(q2)|θ] (4.34)
and
g(θ) = q
∆H − θ
∆H
θ(1− 1/2) + E1[Π(q2)|θ] (4.35)
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from proposition 7.
Let f(θ) = fBM(θ) + fSEC(θ) and g(θ) = gBM(θ) + gSEC(θ), with fBM(θ) =
q∆H−θ
∆H
θ(1−1/2))+(1−q)∆L−θ
∆L
θ(1−1/2) and gBM(θ) = q∆H−θ∆H θ(1−1/2)denoting
the first period’s profits. Problem (4.33) results in the same function as propo-
sition 7, except that the fund manager weights the first period’s profits only by
γP . Then the problem (4.33) can be written as
max
θ∈[0,∆H ]
1θ<∆L(γPfBM(θ) + fSEC(θ)) + 1θ≥∆L(γPgBM(θ) + gSEC(θ)). (4.36)
I maximise over a continuous function that has a kink at θ = ∆L. What is the
optimal θ? I see that with θtrader from proposition 7, I obtain
0 = f ′BM(θtrader) + f
′
SEC(θtrader) < γPf
′
BM(θtrader) + f
′
SEC(θtrader). (4.37)
Since f ′BM(θtrader) < 0 and f ′SEC(θtrader) > 0, γP ∈ [0, 1). Note that fBM and
fSEC are continuously differentiable on [0,∆L]. Thus, an increase in θ increases
the expected utility of the fund. It is clear that no θ below θtrader can be optimal
(the function f is strictly increasing in θ in that region). By the results of
proposition 7, a θfund > ∆L is not possible (the function g from that proof is
still strictly decreasing when the first period’s profits are weighted by γP and
θ > ∆H/2). Thus, I have θfund ∈ (θtrader,∆L]. Suppose that γP = 0, then the
fund manager chooses θ to maximise the second period profits by theorem 8. By
lemma 6, in this case θfund = ∆L.1
The initial inflow will be such that the after-fee expected return of the fund is
equal to the outside option. I obtain f˜1 =
(1−γP )Π(q,θfund)
γM
, and the first period’s
expected compensation of the fund is given by γM f˜1 +γP f˜1(R˜1−1) = Π(q, θfund).
Π(q, θfund) + E1[Π(q2)|θ = θfund] < (4.38)
max
θ
Π(q, θ) + E1[Π(q2)|θ] = Π(q, θtrader) + E1[Π(q2)|θ = θtrader].
1 As shown in the figures for γP high enough θfund < ∆L and for low γP θfund = ∆L.
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The last inequality follows by the definition of θtrader, solving the maximisation
problem in proposition 7. This inequality shows that the expected compensation
of the fund is lower than the expected profits of the trader.
Figure 4.2: The function 1θ<∆Lf(θ) + 1θ≥∆Lg(θ), with ∆H = 10,∆L = 7, q =
0.5, γP = 0.05
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Figure 4.3: The function 1θ<∆Lf(θ) + 1θ≥∆Lg(θ), with ∆H = 10,∆L = 7, q =
0.5, γP = 0.01
4.1.8 Proof of corollary 9 (see page 44)
Let Lˆtraderold denote the cutoff point of the trader. This means that for this level
of liquidity, the trader is indifferent. The trader’s expected compensation with
uncertain liquidity is always higher than that of the fund manager by proposition
8. Furthermore, without uncertainty about liquidity, the expected compensation
of the fund is the same as that of the trader. The result follows. If γP = 0, we have
by proposition 8 θfund = ∆L. If the dispersion between ∆H ,∆L is relatively low,
the expected compensation of the fund might be lower with uncertain liquidity
compared to the case when L = ∆L.
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4.1.9 Proof of corollary 10 (see page 44)
The inflow is given by
1− γP
γM
Π(q2)− f˜1. (4.39)
The inflow is convex if the profits in the second period Π(q2) are convex in the
first period profits. Given a market order x˜ = θ, the profits if non zero are given
by 1/2θ. Thus, we have to show that Π(q2) is convex in θ. The second derivative
is given by
∂2
∂2θ2
Π(q2) = 1/4
∆L
2 (∆H −∆L)2 (1− q)
(
(q − 1) ∆H2 − q∆L2
)
q∆H
2(
(∆L − θ) (q − 1) ∆H2 − q∆H ∆L2 + θ q∆L2
)3 > 0.
(4.40)
It is easy to see that the expression satisfies the inequality when θ < ∆L.
4.1.10 Proof of corollary 11 (see page 46)
Let the first period inflow denote f˜1. The fund commits to closing and thus finds
θfund to maximise
2γM f˜1 + γP (Π(q, θ) + E1[Π(q2)|θ]). (4.41)
The fund solves the same problem as the trader. Thus, the fund chooses θfund =
θtrader. f˜1 is such that investors break even over the two periods and this gives
the result that the fund gets the full NPV (the expected profits of the trader).
A high return increases q2 and Π(q2) is increasing in q2. Thus, we get the return
persistence.
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4.1.11 Micro-foundation of the trading opportunity
There is a large continuum of assets with vi ∈ {0, 1}, where i ∈ A, and A is the
universe of assets. The trader is informed about exactly one asset j and can trade
in only that asset. The asset for which he receives information is random and
private information. For each asset, there are noise traders who submit market
orders and a market maker. Suppose that the noise traders are uniform on the
open interval (−L/2, L/2). They demand
y˜i ∼ U(−L/2, L/2) (4.42)
shares of each assets. The noise trade is independent across assets. I assume
that L ∈ {∆H ,∆L} and that the market maker knows L, which is the same for
each asset. The informed trader submits a market order of x˜i shares (which can
be different from zero only for i = j). The market maker observes the total order
flow
z˜i = y˜i + x˜i. (4.43)
However, the market maker cannot observe the individual orders x˜i or y˜i sepa-
rately. I assume each competitive market maker sets the following price for each
asset
Pi = E[vi|z˜i] ∀i ∈ A. (4.44)
Lemma 31. Suppose that the informed trader buys when vj = 1 (x˜j > 0) and
sells otherwise. The price of asset j set by the market maker has the property
Pj ∈ {0, 1/2, 1} (4.45)
and
P(Pj = 1/2) = max(1− |x˜j|
L
, 0) P(Pj = 1) = min(max(
x˜j
L
, 0), 1) (4.46)
P(Pj = 0) = min(max(
−x˜j
L
, 0), 1). (4.47)
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Proof. Let the market maker set the following price function for each asset i:
If z˜i ∈ (−∞,−L/2] then he sets Pi = 0.
If z˜i ∈ (−L/2, L/2) then he sets Pi = 1/2.
If z˜i ∈ [L/2,∞) then he sets Pi = 1.
Let j ∈ A denote the asset for which there is insider trade. It is clear that
E[vi|z˜ ∈ (−∞,−L/2]] = E[vi|z˜i ∈ (−∞,−L/2], j = i, x˜j < 0] = 0, since it is
only possible to obtain this region when the insider places a negative order. Sim-
ilarly, I can see E[vi|z˜i ∈ [L/2,∞)] = E[vi|z˜i ∈ [L/2,∞), j = i, x˜j > 0] = 1. I
obtain that
E[vi|z˜i ∈ (−L/2, L/2)] = P(i = j|z˜i ∈ (−L/2, L/2))E[vi|z˜i ∈ (−L/2, L/2), i = j]
+P(i 6= j|z˜i ∈ (−L/2, L/2))E[vi|z˜i ∈ (−L/2, L/2), i 6= j] = E[vi|z˜i ∈ (−L/2, L/2), i 6=
j] = 1/2.
This follows since I have P(i = j|z˜i ∈ (−L/2, L/2)) = 0, and
E[vi|z˜i ∈ (−L/2, L/2), i = j] ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose that x˜ ∈ [0, L] is the market order
for asset j:
I find that P(Pj = 1/2|x˜) = P(z˜j ∈ (−L/2, L/2)|x˜) = P(y˜j ∈ (−L/2, L/2−x˜)) =
1 − x˜/L. Furthermore, I see that P(Pj = 1|x˜) = P(z˜j ∈ [L/2,∞)|x˜) = P(y˜j ∈
[L/2− x˜, L/2)) = x˜/L and P(Pj = 0|x˜) = P(z˜j ∈ (−∞,−L/2]|x˜) = 0.
If x˜ > L, we obtain that P(Pj = 1|x˜) = 1 and P(Pj = 1/2|x˜) = P(Pj = 0|x˜) = 0.
Similarly, I can show symmetric results for x˜ < 0.
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4.2 Proofs of Chapter 2
4.2.1 Proof of lemma 14 (see page 62)
Proof. In an unrevealing regime in a simple equilibrium at t = 2, the uninformed
funds make R, as noted in the main text. The informed funds make 1/21+d
P
+
1/2R = R + 1/2dR, since the conjectured price is Pˆ2 = 1/R. The probability of
an unrevealing regime is given by ∆−θ˜2
∆
, and the probability of matching with an
informed fund is pi. Thus, the per-dollar benefit is given as in the lemma.
That funds that make the wrong decision are uninformed is trivial (informed
funds always make the right decision in a simple equilibrium). A manager with a
high return could be informed or lucky and uninformed. If lucky, this could be a
previous noise trader or an uninformed fund. By market clearing,2the probability
of obtaining the risky asset for the uninformed fund manager who is indifferent is
given by (b−z1)
(1−θ) at t = 1. Let us denote by R˜ the realised return of the fund. We
can calculate the reputation of a fund that out-performed with the risky asset
P(informed|v1 = 1+d, R˜ = (1+d) 1Pˆ1 ) =
P(informed|v1=1+d)P(R˜=(1+d) 1
Pˆ1
|informed,v1=1+d)
P(R˜=(1+d) 1
Pˆ1
|v1=1+d) =
θ
1+∆
θ
1+∆
+
(∆˜/∆)∆
1+∆
+
(1−θ)(b−∆˜−θ)
(1+∆)(1−θ)
= θ
b
and for a fund that out-performed with the risk-free asset:
P(informed|v1 = 1− d, R˜ = R) = P(informed|v1=1−d)P(R˜=R|informed,v1=1−d)P(R˜=R|v1=1−d)
=
θ
1+∆
θ
1+∆
+
((∆−∆˜)/∆)∆
1+∆
+
(1−θ)
1+∆
(1− (b−∆˜)
1−θ )
= θ
1+∆−b .
It is clear that an investor does not learn anything from returns following a
revealing regime. Thus, no investor will pay the switching cost c.
2As will be confirmed in proposition 16
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4.2.2 Proof of lemma 15 (see page 63)
Proof. I have to show that the assets under management given in the lemma are
the result of optimal flows. For the flows to be optimal, no investor should want
to switch their decision given the decisions of all other investors. It is clear that
all investors will stay with a fund that has outperformed.
Suppose v1 = 1 + d, so the risky asset was the right choice in the first period.
Thus, the reputation of the outperforming fund is given by pi = θ
b
, as learned
from lemma 14. In an interior equilibrium with flows, I have e2Π(θ˜2) = c, so
investors with underperforming funds are indifferent. For an interior equilibrium
to exist, we need α2 > e2, so there are some flows and some money invested with
uninformed funds. Since all the informed funds are among the outperforming
funds, I obtain θα2 = θ˜2. Solving for α2, I find α2 = ∆θ (1 − 2 c/e2b(1−γ)θdR) by as-
sumption (2.14) α2 > e2, so I have an equilibrium with flows. The inflow comes
from a mass of funds 1 − b + ∆. This inflow goes to a mass of b funds. Thus,
the total expected outflow per fund is b
1−b+∆(
∆
θ
(1 − 2 c/e2b
(1−γ)θdR) − e2). I need to
show that e2 − b1−b+∆(∆θ (1− 2 c/e2b(1−γ)θdR)− e2) > 0 so that there are enough funds
for these flows to be feasible. I obtain e2 − b1−b+∆(∆θ (1 − 2 c/e2b(1−γ)θdR) − e2) >
1− δ − κ
1−κ(
∆
θ
− (1− δ)) > 0. The last inequality follows follows by assumption
(2.13), i.e, ∆
θ
< 1−δ
κ
.
Suppose now that v1 = 1 − d. In an interior equilibrium similar to the above,
we obtain α2 = ∆θ (1− 2 c/e2(1+∆−b)(1−γ)θdR ). First, we need to show that α2 > e2 in this
case. This follows by assumptions (2.13) and (2.14). The inflow goes to a mass
of 1 + ∆− b funds, and those fund managers have chosen the risk-free asset. The
inflow comes from a mass of b funds, that is, those that chose the risky asset.
I need to show that e2 − 1−b+∆b (∆θ (1 − 2 c/e2(1+∆−b)(1−γ)θdR ) − e2) > 0. I obtain that
e2− 1−b+∆b (∆θ (1−2 c/e2(1+∆−b)(1−γ)θdR )−e2) > (1−δ)− (∆θ − (1−δ)) > 0 by assumptions
(2.13).
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4.2.3 Proof of proposition 16 (see page 66)
Proof. The proof is quite similar to the one in Guerrieri and Kondor (2012). The
price schedule is as follows.
There exist the following revealing equilibrium regimes:
If zt ∈ [0, θ˜t), then Pt = 1−dR .
If zt ∈ (∆, θ˜t + ∆], then Pt = 1+dR .
There exists a non-revealing equilibrium regime:
If zt ∈ [θ˜t,∆], then Pt = Pˆt.
Here, Pˆt are as in the proposition.
I take the investors fund switching decisions from the lemma 15 as given and
then:
1) I will construct the demand schedules of the fund managers.
2) I will construct asset allocations consistent with these demand schedules.
3) I will show that in the unrevealing regime, no information is transmitted
through the price.
4) I will verify that the demand schedules are optimal given these prices.
5) I will show that the markets clear.
1)
The informed funds submit the following demand schedule3
dI(P ) = {0, 1} Pt ∈ {1 + d
R
,
1− d
R
} (4.48)
dI(P ) = 1v=1+d. Pt = Pˆt. (4.49)
The uninformed funds submit:
dU(P ) = {0, 1} ∀Pt. (4.50)
31 is the indicator function
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2)
The allocation of the auctioneer is:4
Xt(d) = d d ∈ {0, 1} (4.51)
Xt({0, 1}) = b− zt
et − θ˜t
zt ∈ [θ˜t,∆] (4.52)
Xt({0, 1}) = b− ∆˜t
et
zt /∈ [θ˜t,∆] (4.53)
3)
The updated probability is calculated using Bayes’ rule.
P(vt = 1 + d|Pt = Pˆt) = P(vt = 1 + d)P(Pt = Pˆt)|vt = 1 + d)
P(Pt = Pˆt)
(4.54)
=
1/2P(∆˜t ∈ [0,∆− θ˜t])
1/2P(∆˜t ∈ [0,∆− θ˜t]) + 1/2P(∆˜t ∈ [θ˜t,∆])
= 1/2.
Thus, I have shown that there is no information revealed in this case. It is clear
that the other prices fully reveal vt, by the demand of informed fund managers.
4)
At t = 1, the informed and the uninformed fund manager anticipate the opti-
mal investor flows and the resulting assets under management as summarised in
lemma 15. It is clear that the informed managers strategy is optimal. In a reveal-
ing regime, the strategy of uninformed managers is optimal since they perfectly
mimic informed managers. For uninformed managers to submit the above de-
mand schedule in the unrevealing regime, they have to be indifferent between the
two assets. Given risk neutrality and the price that makes their expected utility
the same (guaranteed by (2.23)), this is the case when the following condition is
satisfied:
E[Xt({0, 1}))|vt = 1 + d, Pt = Pˆt] = (4.55)
4Since by assumption (2.15) 1− δ − b > 2∆ > 0, we have that all X(d) ∈ [0, 1]
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E[Xt({0, 1}))|vt = 1− d, Pt = Pˆt].
This means that the probability of getting the risky asset does not depend on
vt, so that d = {0, 1} is optimal. A price Pt = Pˆt and vt = 1 + d, means
∆˜ ∈ [0,∆− θ˜t]. A price Pt = Pˆt and vt = 1− d, means ∆˜ ∈ [θ˜t,∆]. We get
E[Xt({0, 1})|vt = 1− d, Pt = Pˆt] =
∫ ∆
θ˜t
b− ∆˜
(et − θ˜t)
1
(∆− θ˜t)
d∆˜ (4.56)
=
1
2(et − θ˜t)
(2b− θ˜t −∆) (4.57)
and
E[Xt({0, 1})|vt = 1 + d, Pt = Pˆt] =
∫ ∆−θ˜t
0
b− θ˜t − ∆˜
(et − θ˜t)
1
(∆− θ˜t)
d∆˜ (4.58)
=
1
2(et − θ˜t)
(2b− θ˜t −∆). (4.59)
I see that both expressions are the same and so the demand schedule is optimal.
The assumption (2.16) makes sure that Pˆ1 ∈ [1−dR , 1+dR ]. It is obvious that
E[α2|ψ = S]− E[α2|ψ = V ] > −∆θ . Thus, I get
Pˆ1 =
1
R(1+ω(E[α2|ψ=S]−E[α2|ψ=V ])) <
1
R(1−ω∆
θ
))
< 1
R(1− d
d+1
)
= 1+d
R
. It is also clear that
E[α2|ψ = S]− E[α2|ψ = V ] < ∆θ , and so I get that Pˆ1 > 1−dR .
5)
Suppose vt = 1 − d and Pt = Pˆt, then I have (et − θ˜t) b−∆˜tet−θ˜t + ∆˜t = b. Suppose
v = 1 + d and P = Pˆt, then I obtain (et− θ˜t) b−∆˜t−θ˜tet−θ˜t + ∆˜t + θ˜t = b. Suppose that
v = 1 + d and P = 1+d
R
. I obtain: et b−∆˜tet + ∆˜t = b.
The other cases are similar.
It is clear that given this price function the switching decisions of investors as in
lemma 25 are optimal.
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4.2.4 Proof of proposition 17 (see page 66)
Proof. I differentiate the expression for the expected return E1[R1] = 1Pˆ1 where
Pˆ1 is given by (2.24) and obtain
∂E1[R1]
∂β
= 2
δ (−b3c∆+(−c∆2−c∆+Rdθ2(δ2−1))b2−(1+∆)(−2 c∆2−2 c∆+Rdθ2(δ2−1))b−c∆ (1+∆)3)ω
θ2db(δ2−1)(b−1−∆) ,
a continuous function given our assumptions. This expression has a single simple
root in c, which is given by
cˆ =
Rbdθ2(1 + ∆− b)(1− δ2)
∆ (∆3 − 2 b∆2 + b2∆ + b3 + 3 ∆2 − 4 b∆ + b2 + 3 ∆− 2 b+ 1) . (4.60)
I evaluate the function at c = 0 and find
∂E1[R1]
∂β
(0) = 2δRδω > 0.
Since the function ∂E1[R1]
∂β
is a linear and decreasing function in c, I obtain
∂E1[R1]
∂β
> 0 ⇐⇒ c < cˆ and cˆ > 0.
4.2.5 Proof of proposition 18 (see page 67)
Proof. I take the derivative of the expression for the expected return with respect
to b and get ∂E1[R1]
∂b
= ω∆(κ1 +κ2c), where κ1 := − R(∆+1)(1/2∆
2− b∆+ b2+ ∆− b+1/2)
θ b2(b−1−∆)2
and
κ2 :=
(b2(b−1−∆)2δ2+(b4+(−2 ∆−2)b3+(∆+1)2b2−2 (∆+1)3b+(∆+1)4)(1−2β)δ−2(b2+(−1−∆)b+1/2 (∆+1)2)(∆+1)2)
θ2db2(δ2−1)(b−1−∆)2 .
∂E[R1]
∂b
is a continuous function which is linear in c. I set the equation to zero and
solve for c. I see that the function has a single root in c given by the threshold
level
ˆˆc =
(δ2−1)(∆+1)(∆2−2 ∆ b+2 b2+2 ∆−2 b+1)Rdθ
2 b2(b−∆−1)2δ2−4 (−1/2+β)(b4+(−2 ∆−2)b3+(∆+1)2b2−2 (∆+1)3b+(∆+1)4)δ−4 (b2+(−∆−1)b+1/2 (∆+1)2)(∆+1)2 .
The function ∂E1[R1]
∂b
is linear and increasing5 in c. Therefore, I obtain ∂E1[R]1
∂b
<
5It is easy to check that given our assumptions κ2 > 0
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0 ⇐⇒ c < ˆˆc. I obtain
∂E1[R1]
∂β
(0) = −∆R(∆+1)(1/2 ∆
2+(−b+1)∆+b2−b+1/2)ω
θ b2(b−∆−1)2 < 0. Thus, I obtain
ˆˆc > 0.
4.2.6 Proof of proposition 19 (see page 68)
Proof. i) This is clear.
ii) This is also clear since the expected utility benefit of switching fund is equal
to c.
iii) This follows from the fact that in equilibrium e2Π(θ˜2) = c
iv) The price efficiency is given by θ˜2
∆
and we have e2Π(θ˜2) = c. Thus, the higher
c the lower θ˜2 the lower the price efficiency.
v) Suppose that the reputation of out-performing funds is pi. The price efficiency
is given by
θ˜2
∆
= 1− 2 c
e2dR(1− γ)pi (4.61)
and clearly increasing in e2.
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4.3 Proofs of Chapter 3
4.3.1 Proof of lemma 22 (see page 80)
Proof. The proof will be trivial given the results of the two-period model from
theorem 26. Note that by assumption (3.4) ∆ < x˜ and x˜ < H. Thus, we can
find b such that b˜ < x˜ and b˜ > ∆.
4.3.2 Proof of lemma 24 (see page 82)
Proof. Let us calculate the probability of being informed given that v1 = 1
using Bayes’ rule. Let R˜ denote the realised return of a fund. By market clear-
ing, the probability of an uninformed fund manager obtaining the risky asset
when v1 = 1 in the unrevealing regime is given by (b˜1−∆˜1−θ˜1)x˜1−θ˜1 . Thus, we obtain
P(R˜ = R
1−q |v1 = 1) = θ1+∆/x˜1 +
(∆˜1/∆)∆/x˜1
1+∆/x˜1
+ (1−θ)(b˜1−∆˜1−θ˜1)
(1+∆/x˜1)(x˜1−θ˜1) . The first term is
the probability of getting an informed fund who invested in the risky asset6, the
second is the probability of a noise trader investing in the risky asset, and the
last term is the probability of an uninformed fund manager investing in the risky
asset. I also note that θ˜1 = θx˜1.
P(informed|v1 = 1, R˜ = R1−q ) =
P(informed|v1=1)P(R˜= R1−q |informed,v1=1)
P(R˜= R
1−q |v1=1)
=
θ
1+∆/x˜1
θ
1+∆/x˜1
+
(∆˜1/∆)∆/x˜1
1+∆/x˜1
+
(1−θ)(b˜1−∆˜1−θ˜1)
(1+∆/x˜1)(x˜1−θ˜1)
= θ˜1
b˜
.
In the case of v1 = 0, I get
P(informed|v1 = 0, R˜ = R) = P(informed|v1=0)P(R˜=R|informed,v1=0)P(R˜=R|v1=0)
=
θ
1+∆/x˜1
θ
1+∆/x˜1
+
((∆−∆˜1)/∆)∆/x˜1
1+∆/x˜1
+
(1−θ)
(1+∆/x˜1)
(1− b˜−∆˜1
x˜1−θ˜1
)
= θ˜1
x˜1+∆−b˜ .
6By definition, in a simple equilibrium, informed fund managers always make the right choice
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4.3.3 Proof of lemma 25 (see page 83)
Proof. Suppose the probability to match with an informed manager is pi. In
equilibrium, we need that given the set of all households decisions x˜, no household
i wants to change its decision. This happens when (1− γ)piqR(∆−θ˜t
∆
)− γR = 0.
If this equation is satisfied, there is no utility gained by any household changing
its decision. An informed fund manager is never fired at t = 1; therefore, we
have θ˜2 = pix˜2. Then, we can solve for x˜2. The proof is similar for x˜1.
4.3.4 Proof of theorem 26 (see page 85)
Proof. I need to show that at each time there is a simple equilibrium. Suppose
that bt is given as in the theorem. I take the flows as in lemma 25 at each time
as given and I consider the following pricing function:
If zt ∈ (∆, θ˜t + ∆] then Pt = 1R .
If zt ∈ [θ˜t,∆] then Pt = (1− q)/R.
If zt ∈ [0, θ˜t) then Pt = 0.
I proceed with the following steps:
1) I construct demand schedules of the fund managers.
2) I construct asset allocations consistent with these demand schedules.
3) I show that in the unrevealing regime, no information is transmitted through
the price.
4) I verify that the demand schedules are optimal given these prices.
5) I show that markets clear
6) I show that the intermediary breaks even.
7) I show that the household flows are optimal
Demand schedules
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The informed submit the following demand schedule
dIt (1/R) = {0, 1} (4.62)
dIt (
1− q
R
) = vt (4.63)
dIt (0) = 0. (4.64)
The uninformed submit
dUt (Pt) = {0, 1} ∀Pt 6= 0 (4.65)
dUt (0) = 0. (4.66)
The households submit7
dHt (1/R) = {0, 1} (4.67)
dHt (Pt) = 0 ∀Pt 6= 1/R. (4.68)
Asset allocations
The allocation of the auctioneer is
X t(d) = d d ∈ {0, 1} (4.69)
X t({0, 1}) = bt
1−q
R
− zt
x˜t − θ˜t
zt ∈ [θ˜t,∆] (4.70)
X t({0, 1}) = bt
1
R
− ∆˜t
H
zt ∈ (∆, θ˜t + ∆] (4.71)
X t({0, 1}) = 0 zt ∈ [0, θ˜t) (4.72)
3)
Using Bayes’ rule, I calculate
P(vt = 1|Pt = 1− q
R
) =
P(vt = 1)P(Pt = 1−qR )|vt = 1)
P(Pt = 1−qR )
(4.73)
7The households asset allocation did not come up in the main text since they are restricted to invest
in risk-free assets.
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=
(1− q)P(∆˜t ∈ [0,∆− θ˜t])
(1− q)P(∆˜t ∈ [0,∆− θ˜t]) + qP(∆˜t ∈ [θ˜t,∆])
= 1− q.
The result follows, since we have for the uniform distribution P(∆˜t ∈ [0,∆−θ˜t]) =
P(∆˜t ∈ [θ˜t,∆]). It is clear that the other prices fully reveal vt, by the demand of
informed fund managers.
Optimal demands
It is clear that the informed fund managers demand schedules are optimal given
their information and the that inflow they can obtain. Furthermore, when prices
are fully revealing, it is clear that the demand schedules of uninformed managers
are optimal because they mimic the informed fund managers. In order for un-
informed funds to submit indifference in the unrevealing regime, the expected
utility of submitting d = 1 and d = 0 must be the same. This is the case, since
b1 is such that b˜1 solves (3.23) at t = 1. Furthermore, we need to check that the
probability of getting the risky asset does not depend on vt, so that d = {0, 1} is
optimal. A price Pt = 1−qR and vt = 1, means ∆˜ ∈ [0,∆ − θ˜t]. A price Pt = 1−qR
and vt = 0, means ∆˜ ∈ [θ˜t,∆]. We get
E[X t({0, 1})|vt = 0, Pt = 1− q
R
] =
∫ ∆
θ˜t
bt
1−q
R
− ∆˜
(x˜t − θ˜t)
1
(∆− θ˜t)
d∆˜ (4.74)
=
1
2(x˜t − θ˜t)
(2bt
1− q
R
− θ˜t −∆) (4.75)
and
E[X t({0, 1})|vt = 1, Pt = 1− q
R
] =
∫ ∆−θ˜t
0
bt
1−q
R
− θ˜t − ∆˜
(x˜t − θ˜t)
1
(∆− θ˜t)
d∆˜ (4.76)
=
1
2(x˜t − θ˜t)
(2bt
1− q
R
− θ˜t −∆). (4.77)
It is easy to see that the expressions are the same. Then we see that submitting
{0, 1} is optimal.
Allocation functions
It is clear that the allocations are consistent with the demand schedules.8
8The allocation probabilities Xt(d) ∈ [0, 1] ,since H is large and the assumptions on b
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Market clearing
Suppose that zt ∈ (∆, θ˜t + ∆]. Then, the price is P = 1/R. Everyone is indif-
ferent, and since b 1
R
= ∆˜t +
b/R−∆˜t
H
H, markets clear.9 Suppose that zt ∈ [θ˜t,∆];
then, we have b1−q
R
= zt +
b 1−q
R
−zt
x˜t−θ˜t (x˜t− θ˜t), and thus markets clear. If zt ∈ [0, θ˜t),
then markets clear since there is no demand for the risky asset and no nominal
supply.
Intermediary
In the simple equilibrium, we get that E[Pt] = q(∆−θ˜t∆
1−q
R
+ θ˜t
∆
0 )+(1−q)(∆−θ˜t
∆
1−q
R
+
θ˜t
∆
1 )
= 1−q
R
. Thus, the intermediary breaks even when producing bt as specified in the
theorem. This means that b1 is given as specified in the theorem and b2 is can
be chosen such that b˜2 > ∆ and b˜2 < x˜2.
Household flows
It is clear that given this price function the flows as in lemma 25 are optimal.
4.3.5 Proof of theorem 27 (see page 86)
Proof. The limit equilibrium is the obvious limit case of proposition 26.
We have P(Pt = 1−qR ) = 1 − 1κL x˜t. As we approach the limit, b˜1 converges to
κL(3q− 1)− κLκF + κLκF (q− 2q2). An equilibrium exists when b˜1 > 0 and x˜1 > b˜.
We have that x˜1 = κL(1 − κFq ). Let q < 1/2; we find that b˜1 > 0 and x˜1 > 0 if
and only if κF < q. For κF < q, we have b˜1 < x˜1 as long as q−2q
2
1−q < κF .
Suppose that q > 1/2. We need x˜1 > 0 so κF < q; as long as κF > 2q − 1 we
have x˜1 > b˜1 > 0.
9By the assumption (3.5) and the assumptions on bt, we always have that the probability term is
in [0, 1].
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Suppose that the conditions are satisfied. We have x˜2 = b˜1κLx˜1
(
1− b˜1κF
x˜1 q
)
for the
case v1 = 1 and x˜2 = (x˜1−b˜1)κLx˜1
(
1− (x˜1−b˜1)κF
x˜1 q
)
for the case v1 = 0. We have
b˜1
x˜1
< 1 and (x˜1−b˜1)
x˜1
< 1 and so it is clear that x˜2 > 0. Thus, b2 can be chosen so
that x˜2 > b˜2 > 0.
4.3.6 Proof of proposition 28 (see page 87)
Proof. We have that x˜1 = κL(1 − κFq ) and b˜1 is as in theorem 27. We take the
ratio and plug in b˜1 and find (3.34). Suppose q < 1/2; then, we find the interval
from plugging in the possible values of κF . Similarly, for the case q > 1/2. We
find that ∂
∂κF
b˜1
x˜1
= q
κF
− q(−2 q+κF+1)
κF 2
> 0 ⇐⇒ q > 1/2.
4.3.7 Proof of proposition 29 (see page 89)
We get the expression from plugging in x˜1 = κL(1 − κF/q), b˜1 = κL(3q − 1) −
κLκF +
κL
κF
(q − 2q2) and x˜2 = b˜1κLx˜1
(
1− b˜1κF
x˜1 q
)
for the case v1 = 1. If v1 = 0, we
have x˜2 = (x˜1−b˜1)κLx˜1
(
1− (x˜1−b˜1)κF
x˜1 q
)
. The results for the limits are straightforward.
4.3.8 Proof of proposition 30 (see page 90)
The limits are straightforward from proposition 29.
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